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The Rule 2019 Battle 
WHEN HEDGE FUNDS COLLIDE  
WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 imposes 
certain disclosure requirements on committees representing 
more than one creditor or equity security holder in Chapter 9 
and Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.1 It is “part of the disclosure 
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code and is designed to foster the 
goal of reorganization plans which deal fairly with creditors 
and which are arrived at openly.”2 The Rule seeks to provide 
complete disclosure to all parties involved in bankruptcy cases, 
prevent conflicts of interest, and promote overall fairness in the 
reorganization process.3 Although the disclosure requirements 
of Rule 2019 have existed in bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings for nearly seventy years, they had been virtually 
ignored until hedge funds began to actively participate in 
bankruptcy cases.4 
Hedge funds have become major participants in 
bankruptcy proceedings, in which they often form unofficial  
  
 1 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. 
 2 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 2019.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 
eds., 15th ed. 2007). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Menachem O. Zelmanovitz & Matthew W. Olsen, Rule 2019: A Long 
Neglected Rule of Disclosure Gains Increasing Prominence in Bankruptcy, http:// 
www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Restructuring_Newsletter_Summer20071.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2008) (“Recent divergent decisions of two bankruptcy courts have catapulted a 
largely ignored rule of procedure into the forefront of issues concerning hedge fund 
participation in bankruptcy cases.”). 
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or ad hoc committees.5 These ad hoc committees share the 
expenses of participating in bankruptcy cases by hiring legal 
counsel and other professionals to represent them throughout 
the process.6 By acting as a group, they are also able to exert 
greater influence and increase their leverage, since together 
they control a greater percentage of the company’s claims.7 
While this arrangement is especially beneficial to hedge funds, 
it raises unique disclosure issues.8 These disclosure issues have 
been the subject of two recent bankruptcy court decisions 
involving ad hoc committees and the application of Rule 2019.9 
In February 2007, in In re Northwest Airlines Corp.,  
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District 
of New York held that an ad hoc committee failed to fulfill  
the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 and ordered the 
committee to file a modified 2019 statement.10 Pursuant to  
the Rule’s requirements, the court required each member of the 
committee to disclose the amounts of claims and interests 
owned, when the claims and interests were acquired, the 
amounts paid for the claims and interests, and any sales of the 
claims and interests.11 The committee then filed a motion 
requesting the court to permit the additional Rule 2019 
statement to be filed under seal. The court denied the motion.12 
Conversely, in April 2007, in In re Scotia Development LLC 
(“Scopac”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Texas denied a similar motion to compel 
an ad hoc committee to comply with the disclosure require-
ments of Rule 2019.13 The judge in that case decided that the  
  
 5 Eric B. Fisher, Hedge Funds and the Changing Face of Corporate 
Bankruptcy Practice, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (2007). 
 6 Id. at 87. 
 7 Id. (“[S]uch committees offer similarly-situated creditors an avenue to 
increase their leverage within the bankruptcy case and to share legal and other 
expenses. Ad hoc committees are particularly effective when their members hold a 
blocking position with respect to a class of claims.”). 
 8 Id. at 88. 
 9 See generally In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest I), 363 B.R. 701 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest II), 363 B.R. 704 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Scotia Development LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 
2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007). 
 10 Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704. 
 11 Id. at 702 (“The Rule requires disclosure of ‘the amounts of claims or 
interests owned by the members of the committee, the times when acquired, the 
amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof.’ The [committee’s] 
statement . . . fails to disclose this information and is insufficient on its face.”). 
 12 Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 705. 
 13 In re Scotia Development, 2007 WL 2726902, at *1. 
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ad hoc committee was not a committee for the purposes of  
Rule 2019.14 
This Note focuses on whether ad hoc committees 
comprised of hedge funds or private equity firms should be 
required to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 
2019. It argues that Rule 2019 in its current form was enacted 
to address abuses by protective committees in the 1930s, and 
does not contemplate the types of investors or committees that 
exist today. Further, if required to comply with the current 
Rule 2019, investors like hedge funds and private equity firms 
will likely stop trading in distressed claims, which would be 
inefficient for the market for distressed securities. However, 
while efficiency is important to the financial markets, 
transparency is important to bankruptcy cases, and a proper 
balance must be struck to address these competing interests. 
Therefore, Rule 2019 should be amended to facilitate market 
efficiency while still allowing for disclosure of the information 
that is necessary to administer a bankruptcy case.  
Part I of this Note explores the background of hedge 
funds and their role in bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the 
history, requirements, and purpose of Rule 2019. Part II 
evaluates the recent bankruptcy decisions of Northwest and 
Scopac. Part III discusses the importance of disclosure and 
transparency to bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the 
implications of disclosure on the liquidity in the distressed 
securities market. Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to 
Rule 2019 that will strike a balance between the competing 
interests discussed in Part III. The solution will only require 
disclosure of the information necessary for successful reorg-
anizations, without having the effect of shutting down claims 
trading and decreasing the liquidity of the distressed claims 
market. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Hedge Funds: Friend or Foe? 
A hedge fund is “an investment vehicle that pools 
capital from a number of investors and invests in securities and 
other instruments.”15 They are customarily private investment 
  
 14 Id. at 2. 
 15 THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 1:1 (2007). 
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funds, open to only a limited number of investors.16 This self-
imposed restriction is extremely beneficial because it allows 
hedge funds to be lightly regulated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and other regulatory agencies.17 
Unlike heavily regulated mutual funds, which are subject to 
numerous disclosure requirements, hedge funds typically do 
not have to disclose their investment activities to third 
parties.18 They have become notorious for their secrecy and do 
not want the public knowing “who their investors are, what 
they invest in, what they pay for their investments, or, more 
importantly, what their return is on their investments.”19 This 
secrecy is particularly important to hedge funds because it 
allows them to protect their investment strategies and prevent 
others from duplicating their trading models.20 While hedge 
funds were originally designed to use their leverage and short 
selling strategies to hedge their position in equity trading 
markets, many funds today have a wide variety of investment 
strategies and techniques.21 Of particular significance to this 
Note is that in recent years many hedge funds have in fact 
become very active in the market for distressed securities.22 
Distressed securities are the securities of companies 
that are in “severe economic distress, possibly facing bank-
ruptcy, reorganization, or otherwise involved in restructurings 
  
 16 Id. 
 17 See id. Hedge funds are only available to accredited investors, and are not 
sold to the general public. As a result, hedge funds are exempt from certain 
registration requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Id.; see also 
Paul F. Roye, Remarks at the Global Challenge in Investment Management Regulatory 
and Legal Issues, Apr. 19, 2002, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch552.htm (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2008) (noting two major exemptions under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 for funds with less than 100 investors and funds where the investors are 
“qualified purchasers”). 
 18 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge 
Funds and Funds of Hedge Funds, http://sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last visited Apr. 
10, 2008). 
 19 Seymour Roberts, Jr. & Joe Wielebinski, When Worlds Collide: The Clash 
Between Hedge Funds and the Bankruptcy Code, May 21, 2007, at 1, 
http://www.munsch.com/publication.cfm?publication_id=178 (follow “View Document” 
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 20 Hedge funds “use a combination of market philosophies and analytical 
techniques to develop financial models that identify and evaluate market oppor-
tunities. Very often, the financial models are very sophisticated, highly quantitative 
and proprietary to the fund.” Thomas G. Evans et al., Hedge Fund Investing, J. 
ACCOUNTANCY ONLINE, http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/feb2005/evans.htm (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2008).  
 21 Mark Berman & Jo Ann J. Brighton, Hedge Funds: Lessons Learned from 
the Radnor Decision, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (2007). 
 22 Id. 
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or recapitalizations.”23 Many hedge funds buy bonds, loans, or 
equity of these companies at deep discounts hoping to profit 
from the market’s lack of understanding of the value of these 
investments.24 They are able to purchase these securities at a 
discount due to the companies’ financial trouble.25 In addition, 
many banks and institutional investors are forced to sell such 
risky securities that tend to decrease the value of their 
investment portfolios.26 Hedge funds pursue these investments 
hoping to earn above-market returns, and, as a result, have 
become increasingly active in corporate bankruptcy proceed-
ings.27 More and more, hedge funds are purchasing distressed 
securities in companies only if they think they can influence 
the bankruptcy proceedings, and if they think they can gain 
high returns on their investment.28 
Some believe that hedge funds’ involvement in bank-
ruptcy proceedings is extremely beneficial to the reorganization 
process because it leads to “more competitive financing terms 
and increased liquidity in the debt markets.”29 They are also 
particularly useful in the restructuring process because they 
can make different types of investments (debt and equity) in a 
single company.30 Additionally, their exemption from tradi-
tional regulation allows them to quickly adapt their investment 
strategies to the situation at hand.31  
While some investors, commentators, and companies 
value their participation in corporate bankruptcy, hedge funds 
also have their critics. As owners of debt in a company, they 
can influence the restructuring process and have a significant 
say in that company’s future.32 They are able to influence the 
  
 23 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Fisher, supra note 5, at 24. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See id.; see also Timothy F. Geithner, Hedge Funds and Derivatives and 
Their Implications for the Financial System, Remarks at the Distinguished Lecture 
2006, sponsored by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Hong Kong Association of 
Banks, Hong Kong (Sept. 15, 2006), transcript available at www.newyorkfed.org/ 
newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060914.html) (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) (“In most 
circumstances, increased trading and participation contributes to market liquidity and 
makes markets less volatile. The ultimate benefit should be lower risks for all market 
participants.”). 
 30 Berman, supra note 21, at 30. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A1 (“[H]edge funds have also grown prominent in corporate 
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bankruptcy case and protect their interests because as a 
committee, they have standing to be heard on any issue 
involved in the proceedings.33 This is troubling to some because 
hedge funds tend to have short-term investment objectives and 
may own both debt and equity in the same company, leaving 
them with seemingly conflicting priorities.34 The lack of any 
strict regulatory oversight over their activities also contributes 
to the general negative perception of hedge funds in the 
industry.35 
B. The Bankruptcy Code and Rule 2019 
It has been said that the “three most important words in 
the bankruptcy system are: disclose, disclose, disclose.”36 In 
fact, transparency is “one of the hallmarks of the bankruptcy 
process,” which is illustrated by a number of provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code including Rule 2019 disclosures.37 Disclosure 
by the debtor allows creditors to assess the financial affairs of 
the company and decide whether a proposed plan of 
reorganization is feasible and in their best interests.38 On the 
other hand, disclosure by creditor committees, like those 
required by Rule 2019, allows the debtor and other parties 
involved in the case to understand with whom they are 
negotiating and who will be voting on the reorganization plan.39 
Historically, bankruptcy was generally meant to be an open 
  
bankruptcies, where they can make a cheap bet on a company’s recovery by buying its 
debt. By owning the debt, they can become powerful creditors and serve on committees 
that have a large say in the future of a company.”). 
 33 John D. Ayer et al., What Every Unsecured Creditor Should Know About 
Chapter 11, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 40 (2004). 
 34 Anderson, supra note 32, at A1. 
 35 Id. 
 36 In re Sanchez, 372 B.R. 289, 305 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007). 
 37 Michael P. Richman & Jill L. Murch, The Importance of Full Disclosure in 
Seeking Success Fees Under §328(a), 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 87 (2007). (Other 
examples of transparency are the debtor’s schedules and the 341 meeting.) 
 38 Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy 
and Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1213, 1248 
(1994); see also Harvey L. Tepner, Common Sense, Nonsense and Higher Authorities: 
The Need for Improved Chapter 11 Financial Disclosures, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 37 
(2003) (“Proper financial disclosure by debtors enables creditors and other parties to 
make decisions based on information rather than rumor, speculation or supposition.”). 
 39 Mark Berman, Will the Sunlight of Disclosure Chill Hedge Funds, 26 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 24, 64 (May 2007) (“[I]f committee members want the benefit of 
collective participation [in bankruptcy cases], they must accept a fiduciary obligation to 
the class and disclosure rules must be complied with.”). 
2008] THE RULE 2019 BATTLE 1417 
arena where all parties could work together and come to a 
mutually beneficial decision.40 
Compliance with Rule 2019 requires the filing of a 
verified statement containing the following information: (1) the 
name and address of each creditor or equity security holder; (2) 
the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of 
acquisition if it was acquired within a year of the filing of  
the petition; (3) the facts and circumstances in connection with 
the employment of the representative filing the statement,  
and, for committees, the names of the entities who employed or 
organized the committees; and (4) the amounts of claims or 
interests owned by the representatives or committee members, 
the times they were acquired, the prices paid, and any 
subsequent sales of the claims or interests.41 Additionally, if 
there are material changes to the information presented in the 
original disclosure statement, the Rule requires that a supple-
mental statement be filed to update the information.42 If an 
entity or committee fails to comply with these requirements, 
the Rule sets out sanctions that may be imposed.43 Among  
other forms of relief, a court may prohibit those entities or 
committees that fail to comply from further participation in the 
bankruptcy proceedings.44 
Rule 2019 covers entities and committees that act in a 
fiduciary capacity but are not otherwise controlled by the 
court.45 This specifically excludes official committees that are 
required to be organized under other provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.46 Official committees are exempt from the 
disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 because they are 
otherwise “subject to direct court oversight in a variety of 
ways.”47 
  
 40 Adam H. Kurland, Debtors’ Prism: Immunity for Bankrupts Under the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Part I), 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 177, 179 (1981) (“Full 
disclosure of all relevant information has always been an important policy of the 
bankruptcy laws . . . .”). 
 41 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, § 2019.02. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Zelmanovitz & Olsen, supra note 4. “Among other things, official 
committees are appointed by the United States Trustee and must seek bankruptcy 
court authorization to retain professionals and court approval of their professional fees 
and expenses. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 327, 328, 330.” Id. at note 9. 
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The original purpose of Rule 2019 can be traced back 
almost seventy years to an influential study conducted by 
William O. Douglas48 for the SEC in the 1930s.49 Douglas held 
public hearings for fifteen months, calling hundreds of wit-
nesses who testified about inside groups working with 
bankrupt companies to take advantage of creditors. The invest-
igation uncovered “[i]nside arrangements, unfair committee 
representation, lack of oversight, and outright fraud [that] 
often cheated investors in financially troubled or bankrupt 
companies out of their investments.”50 The final report, entitled 
Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, 
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization 
Committees (“Douglas Report”), “centered on abuses by 
unofficial committees in corporate reorganizations and equity 
receiverships.”51 The unofficial committees addressed in the 
report, unlike the committees that exist today, were referred  
to as protective committees. These committees were often 
sponsored by the debtor and solicited deposit agreements from 
individual creditors that granted control over the claims to the 
committees.52 Douglas viewed the members of these protective 
committees as fiduciaries that owed “exclusive loyalty to the 
class of investors they represent[ed]” because the deposit 
agreements were irrevocable and transferred all powers from 
the owner of the claim to the committee.53 Based on his 
investigation, Douglas explained that many of these 
committees frequently violated that fiduciary duty to the 
depositor in two ways: (1) conflict of interests and (2) the 
exercise of excessive powers by committee members.54 As will 
  
 48 William O. Douglas later served as a Supreme Court Justice from April 17, 
1939 to November 12, 1975. With a term lasting thirty-six years and seven months, he 
is the longest-serving justice in the history of the Court. 
 49 Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 50 Douglas and the Protective Committee Investigation: Implementing the 
Power of the SEC through Investigative Hearings and Legislative Recommendations, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/douglas/protectiveCommittee.php (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 51 Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704. 
 52 William O. Douglas, Statement before Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/ 
papers/1930/1937_0608_Douglas_ProtCom.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 53 Id. 
 54 With respect to conflicts of interests, Douglas pointed to several examples, 
including committees dominated by management and investment bankers, bondholders 
serving on stockholders’ committees and vice versa, and committee members serving 
their own individual interests. He pointed to a hypothetical case where some 
committee members may have acquired their securities at very low prices, and others 
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be discussed in this Note, while the protective committees that 
Douglas investigated are unlike the committees that exist 
today, some of these examples of abuses are still relevant 
today.55 
Douglas concluded that existing laws were not sufficient 
and that “public investors needed protection from insiders in 
reorganization cases.”56 Douglas made several recommenda-
tions to Congress based on the evidence he presented. One of 
the recommendations was that any person who represents 
more than twelve creditors or stockholders (including commit-
tees) appearing in the bankruptcy cases be required to file a 
sworn statement that included the following: the amount of 
securities or claims owned by the investor being represented, 
the dates of acquisition, the amount paid for the securities  
or claims, and any subsequent sale or transfer.57 This 
recommendation led to the adoption of Chapter X of the former 
Bankruptcy Act,58 which became Rule 10-211 under the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code and later Rule 2019.59 Though many changes 
were made to the provisions affecting reorganizations, the 
drafters of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code retained the substance of 
the original Rule in the current Rule 2019.60 In fact, in the 
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it was 
stated that “[t]he Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws is of 
  
may have acquired their securities at or near to par value. These instances would 
create an automatic conflict of interest since the committee members who purchased at 
low prices may want to agree to a settlement that would be of economic harm to those 
who purchased at or near to par. He said that “[o]ut of such circumstances are serious 
conflicts of interest born.” Id.  
  With respect to the exercise of excessive powers by committee members, 
Douglas pointed to numerous examples, including committee members trading the 
securities of a corporation undergoing reorganization based on inside information, 
committees fixing their own fees without supervision, committees paying solicitors to 
use “high pressure” tactics to get investors to deposit their securities, and one-sided 
deposit agreements giving control of the investors’ securities to the committee and 
immunizing the committee from responsibility. Id. 
 55 See infra Part IV. 
 56 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 30 (1995). 
 57 William O. Douglas, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, 
Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees 
(1937), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1937_0510_ 
SEC_003.pdf. 
 58 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was significantly amended by the 1938 
Chandler Act, which added, among other things, the predecessor to the current 
Chapter 11 provisions that govern corporate reorganization. This was replaced by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, also known as the Bankruptcy Code. 
 59 Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 60 Id. 
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the opinion that the conclusions and recommendations of the 
protective committee study and the Congressional policy 
embodied in the Chandler Act61 are still valid.”62 While some of 
the conclusions of the study are certainly relevant today, it is 
clear that this Rule was enacted to specifically address abuses 
by protective committees in the 1930s that solicited deposit 
agreements from investors. This Note argues that over the 
years, the nature of unofficial committees changed significantly 
and Rule 2019 was never amended to meet the needs of the 
changing marketplace.  
Though some claim that there is relatively little case 
law applying Rule 2019, there have been many cases where the 
Rule has been applied.63 However, there are very few cases 
applying the Rule to unofficial or ad hoc committees.64 The 
existing case law provides some evidence that when courts 
have applied the Rule, it was to ensure the overall fairness and 
integrity of the bankruptcy process.65 However, prior to the 
Northwest decision, no unofficial or ad hoc committees had 
been required to file disclosure statements in accordance with 
Rule 2019.66 Typically, the legal counsel or law firms hired by 
committee members got away with filing a verified statement 
that disclosed the names of the committee members and the 
aggregate equity or debt holdings that the committee repre-
sented.67  
Until Northwest, hedge funds in particular had partici-
pated in bankruptcy proceedings for many years without being 
subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019. They have 
  
 61  See supra note 58 (describing the Chandler Act).  
 62 Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. 
Doc. No. 93-137, at 247 (1973). 
 63 Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704 (“Although the Committee argues that the 
Rule has been frequently ignored or watered down, there is no shortage of cases 
applying it.”). 
 64 Zelmanovitz & Olsen, supra note 4 (noting that the majority of cases 
applying Rule 2019 have involved law firms representing class action plaintiffs against 
the debtor’s estate). The court’s main concern was whether the lawyer had the 
authority to represent the class. Id.  
 65 See In re Congoleum Corp, 321 B.R. 147, 167 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) 
(ordering disclosure under Rule 2019 “to prevent conflicts of interest among Creditors’ 
counsel from undermining the fairness of the Plan, bringing to bear the values of good 
faith and fairness in the reorganization process that pervade the bankruptcy code”); In 
re Oklahoma P.A.C. First Limited Partnership, 122 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990) 
(ordering compliance with Rule 2019 because the attorney represented conflicting 
interests in the case where the debtor filed for bankruptcy and the same law firm 
represented all creditors). 
 66 Zelmanovitz & Olsen, supra note 4. 
 67 Id. 
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often done so as members of ad hoc committees, since they are 
especially resistant to disclosing internal financial and trading 
information to debtors or the general public.68 
II. NORTHWEST AND SCOPAC: RULE 2019 EMERGES 
The court in Northwest received the attention of every-
one in the bankruptcy industry when it applied Rule 2019  
on its face to require ad hoc committees to disclose their 
trading information. It sent a strong message to industry 
experts, distressed companies, investors, creditors, and—most 
importantly—hedge funds. Scopac came on the heels of the 
Northwest decision, and once again drew the attention of 
everyone in the industry, when that court appeared to ignore 
the plain meaning of the Rule and refused to require disclosure 
because of the effects it would have on the claims-trading 
market. Clearly, the Scopac decision is at odds with Northwest 
and has added another piece to the already complicated Rule 
2019 puzzle. Hedge funds celebrated a small victory, but the 
decision left everyone wondering how future cases would be 
decided. This Part explores the courts’ decisions and reasoning 
in both cases. It argues that the Northwest court properly 
interpreted the Rule, as Rule 2019 on its face clearly applies  
to ad hoc committees. However, the Scopac court correctly 
recognized the tension that is created when Rule 2019 is 
applied on its face, which forced the court to ignore the plain 
meaning of the Rule. This Part therefore concludes that while 
Rule 2019 in its current form does apply to ad hoc committees, 
it is unequipped to address the needs of the financial market-
place and serve the changing dynamics of bankruptcy cases 
today. 
A.  In Re Northwest Airlines: Debtors Win Round I 
Northwest Airlines filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy petition in September 2005, and the trustee appointed a 
statutory committee of unsecured creditors.69 In November 
  
 68 See supra Part I.A. 
 69 Debtors’ Objection to Motion of the Ad Hoc Equity Committee for an Order 
(A) Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 9018 of 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Granting Leave to File Its Bankruptcy 
Rule 2019(a) Statement Under Seal, (B) Limiting the Disclosure Required in Their 
Rule 2019 Statement and (C) Granting a Temporary Stay Pending Determination of 
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2006, news broke that U.S. Airways had made a bid to acquire 
Delta Air Lines out of its bankruptcy proceedings.70 This caused 
speculation about consolidation in the airline industry, and 
within a week, Northwest’s stock rose nearly 300%.71 This 
prompted a group of investors who regularly invest in 
distressed companies to purchase some of Northwest’s common 
stock.72 Over the next couple of months, these investors sought 
the appointment of an official committee based on the 
contention that the increased share price was evidence of 
Northwest’s solvency.73 In response, the U.S. Trustee declined 
to appoint an official committee.74 These investors then formed 
an ad hoc committee, and in January 2007, they filed a notice 
of appearance in the case.75 The law firm representing the 
committee filed a verified statement pursuant to Rule 2019, 
which included the names of the eleven committee members, 
the aggregate amount of common stock and claims owned by 
the committee members, and a statement that some of the 
claims were acquired after the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy case.76 
In February 2007, Northwest filed a motion seeking, 
among other things, an order compelling the ad hoc committee 
to file an amended 2019 statement disclosing more detailed 
information on the amounts of claims owned by each committee 
member, when these claims were acquired, the amount paid for 
these claims, and any subsequent sale of these claims.77 The ad 
  
This Motion at 4, Northwest I., 363 B.R. 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-17930) 
[hereinafter Northwest Debtors Objection]. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 4-5. 
 73 Id. at 5. The investors argued that the increase in Northwest’s stock price 
as well as general speculation about industry consolidation were evidence that 
Northwest was solvent and there was value for the equity holders. Id. The debtors 
opposed the motion, arguing that an increase in the trading price of their securities 
was not indicative of reorganization value. Id. 
 74 Id. at 6. The U.S. Trustee declined the motion because the ad hoc 
committee “failed to demonstrate both the likelihood of a meaningful recovery for 
equity holders in these cases, and that a separate committee was necessary for their 
adequate representation.” Id. 
 75 Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 701. 
 76 Id. at 701-02. 
 77 Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 7. Northwest argued that 
the ad hoc committee sought to make an impact at a late stage in the reorganization, 
yet the committee’s true purpose remained a mystery because it did not disclose its 
individual holdings. Therefore, Northwest asked the court to prohibit the committee 
from further participating in the case unless it made proper disclosure. Posting of Bob 
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hoc committee opposed the motion, arguing that its 2019 
statement was sufficient.78  
1. The Court’s Decision 
On February 26, 2007, Judge Allan Gropper of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District  
of New York decided in favor of Northwest that the ad hoc 
committee had failed to fulfill the disclosure requirements of 
Rule 2019.79 He ordered the committee to file a modified 2019 
statement within three business days, concluding that “the 
Rule is long-standing, and there is no basis for failure to apply 
it as written.”80 The court’s reasoning was twofold. It first 
addressed the committee’s substantive argument against 
disclosure and then looked to the history and purpose of Rule 
2019. 
The ad hoc committee argued that the Rule on its face 
applied only to “every entity or committee representing more 
than one creditor or equity security holder” and that since no 
committee member represented any party other than itself, 
Rule 2019 did not apply.81 In addition, only the law firm 
represented more than one creditor, but since the firm did not 
have any claims in Northwest, it had nothing to disclose.82 The 
court held that this interpretation of Rule 2019 by the ad hoc 
committee was flawed, stating succinctly that “the Rule cannot 
be so blithely avoided.”83 It pointed out that the law firm’s 
clients appeared as a committee, filed a notice of appearance in 
the case as a committee, moved for the appointment of an 
official committee, and had been litigating discovery issues 
collectively.84 Additionally, the court noted that the committee 
retained a firm to represent it, that it compensated the firm for 
the work done on its behalf, and that the firm represented the 
  
Eisenbach, In the (Red): The Business Bankruptcy Blog, http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/ 
2007/03/ (Mar. 4, 2007). 
 78 Eisenbach, supra note 77 (noting that the committee stated that the 
purpose of the Rule was only to ensure that reorganization plans were negotiated and 
voted on by those authorized to act for the real parties in interest, and that purpose 
was satisfied by its statement). 
 79 Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704. 
 80 Id. at 704. 
 81 Id. at 703. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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interests of the committee collectively, not the interests of 
individual committee members.85  
After responding to the committee’s substantive argu-
ment, Judge Gropper then looked to the history and purpose of 
Rule 2019 with regards to the role of ad hoc committees.86 He 
pointed out that by appearing as a committee, the members 
speak as a group and “implicitly ask the court and other parties 
to give their positions a degree of credibility.”87 The court also 
cited the Douglas Report, which focused on abuses by unofficial 
committees, and accordingly led to the adoption of disclosure 
requirements under the current Rule 2019.88 
The court therefore ordered the ad hoc committee to 
comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 and file 
an amended statement within three business days.89 Specific-
ally, the court required each member of the committee to 
provide the amounts of claims and interests owned, when the 
claims and interests were acquired, the amounts paid for the 
claims and interests, and any sales of the claims and interests.  
2. A Frenzy of Filings: The Committee Seeks Privacy, 
Northwest Seeks Disclosure 
Following Judge Gropper’s ruling, both the ad hoc com-
mittee and Northwest made a series of motions and filings.90 
  
 85 Id. Judge Gropper also distinguished this case from others where a law 
firm might represent individual clients, and as such the firm would be the only party 
required to file a disclosure statement under Rule 2019. He pointed out that this was 
not the case with the ad hoc committee who, based on the facts, clearly formed a group 
and retained counsel to represent the collective interests of that group. Consequently, 
the committee fell under the plain meaning of Rule 2019, and was required to provide 
the information required for each of the individual committee members. Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. The court also noted that because the Bankruptcy Code provides the 
possibility of giving compensation to unofficial committees, disclosure is important. Id. 
 88 Id. at 704. 
 89 Id. 
 90 This case drew the attention of many in the industry, and there were also 
motions from the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, the U.S. Trustee, and 
Bloomberg News, who wanted to weigh in on the court’s decision. See generally 
Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Ad Hoc Equity Commit-
tee’s Motion for an Order Granting Leave to File Its Rule 2019(a) Statement Under 
Seal, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter Northwest Official Committee Objection]; 
Response of the United States Trustee to Motion of Ad Hoc Equity Committee for an 
Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 107(b) and Rule 9018 of the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure Granting Leave to File Its Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) 
Statement Under Seal, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter U.S. Trustee Motion]; 
Memorandum of Law by Bloomberg News in Support of Intervention and in Opposition 
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Essentially, the committee sought to retain the private 
investment information of its members, and Northwest sought 
disclosure of the information that had been ordered by the 
court under Rule 2019.  
The ad hoc committee first filed a motion for an order 
allowing the additional Rule 2019 statement to be filed under 
seal because it constituted confidential commercial information 
and trade secrets as contemplated by Section 107(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.91 The committee argued that hedge funds 
trade using complex and proprietary strategies and maintain 
strict confidentiality over their trading practices.92 Thus, the 
information required under Rule 2019 would prejudice the 
committee members if not filed with the court under seal.93 The 
ad hoc committee also argued that requiring public disclosure 
of confidential information would have a “chilling effect” on 
future creditor participation in bankruptcy proceedings94 and 
discourage investors such as themselves from trading in 
distressed securities on the secondary market.95 
  
to the Ad Hoc Committee’s Request for an Order Sealing Its Rule 2019(a) Disclosures, 
Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter Bloomberg Motion to Intervene]. 
 91 Section 107(b) provides in pertinent part that “[o]n request of a party in 
interest, the bankruptcy court shall, and on the bankruptcy court’s own motion, the 
bankruptcy court may—protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential 
research, development, or commercial information . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 92 Motion of the Ad Hoc Equity Committee for an Order (A) Pursuant to 
Sections 105(a) and 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 9018 of the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure Granting Leave to File Its Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) 
Statement Under Seal, and (B) Granting a Temporary Stay Pending Determination of 
This Motion at 6, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter Northwest Ad Hoc Committee 
Motion]. 
 93 Id. at 6-7. In support of this proposition, the committee relied on prior 
cases that held that information relating to the trading of securities was confidential, 
proprietary and did not have to be disclosed. See, e.g., Fed. Open Market Comm. of Fed. 
Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 363 (1978) (holding that the committee did not 
have to disclose commercial information including the buying and selling of securities 
on the open market), cited in Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at 
6-7. The committee also argued that such relief was not discretionary, but required by 
the Code if the court determined that the information fell under Section 107(b). See, 
e.g., In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191 
B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); In re Handy Andy Home Improvement Centers, 
Inc., 199 B.R. 376, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 94 Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at 10-11. They noted 
that the information required is highly confidential and the committee members do not 
even share it among themselves. Only counsel has access to the information. Id. 
 95 Id. at 11-12. The committee also attempted to convince the court that it 
should not compel the individual committee members to submit the information 
required by Rule 2019, but rather that the committee should be allowed to submit 
aggregate information. In support of this alternative, the committee pointed to the time 
and expense that would be incurred to gather this type of detailed information for a 
significant number of trades. The committee argued that the level of detail ordered by 
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Northwest quickly objected to the ad hoc committee’s 
motion to file the information under seal. It refuted the 
committee’s assertion that the information ordered by the court 
was a trade secret or proprietary information under Section 
107(b).96 Northwest maintained that the information was 
merely historical, factual information, not trading models or 
strategies.97 In support of its argument, Northwest pointed out 
that current SEC regulations require disclosure of this infor-
mation “as part of the fundamental premise that transparency 
promotes fair and efficient markets and market practices.”98 It 
equated this regulation to Rule 2019’s purpose in a bankruptcy 
setting.99 Additionally, Northwest noted that Owl Creek Asset 
Management, one of the leading members of the ad hoc 
committee, had voluntarily disclosed the information required 
by Rule 2019, yet there had been no contention that it had 
suffered any harm or prejudice as a result of its public 
disclosures.100 
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors also 
objected to the ad hoc committee’s motion. It argued that 
allowing the information to be filed under seal would defeat the 
underlying purpose of Rule 2019.101 It claimed that the fact that 
the Code’s drafters required the information to be disclosed 
under the Rule is evidence that the information is not a 
confidential trade secret that should be protected.102 The official 
committee also pointed out that Section 107(b) has never been 
  
the court would not add anything substantive to the proceedings, and noted that the 
price paid for the shares had no effect on the committee members’ rights. Id. at 14-16. 
 96 Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 14. 
 97 Id. 
 98 For example, Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
requires investors who acquire five percent or more of a class of registered equity 
securities to file a statement. Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 15. 
 99 Id. Northwest further contended that the cases cited by the ad hoc 
committee all involved confidential agreements, not historical trading information like 
the case at hand. Id. at 16. 
 100 Id. at 18-19. Northwest also objected to the aggregate information solution 
proposed by the ad hoc committee. It argued that this was insufficient under Rule 
2019, and the complete, individualized information previously ordered was essential for 
the reorganization proceedings to continue. Id. at 11. Northwest also stressed the 
importance of public disclosure of the information and asked the court to deny the 
motion to file under seal. It argued that allowing the ad hoc committee to circumvent 
detailed disclosure to all parties would defeat the essential purpose behind Rule 2019 
of complete disclosure during the reorganization process. Id. 
 101 Northwest Official Committee Objection, supra note 90, at 1-2. The 
committee argued that “disclosure is not complete if the “disclosed” information 
remains under seal.” Id. at 4. 
 102 Id. at 5. 
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used to allow Rule 2019 disclosures to be filed under seal.103 
Furthermore, it argued that the ad hoc committee had not 
proven the existence of “an extraordinary circumstance or 
compelling need” that is required for a seal request to be 
granted.104  
Bloomberg News105 also moved to intervene so that it 
could ensure that the public had access to all the information 
regarding the bankruptcy proceedings.106 It also opposed the ad 
hoc committee’s motion to seal, pointing to the importance of 
transparency in bankruptcy proceedings, the presumption of 
public access mandated by Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and the constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings 
and court documents.107  
The U.S. Trustee108 also weighed in prior to the court’s 
decision, filing a response to the ad hoc committee’s motion. It 
argued that the committee’s aggregate claims solution was 
insufficient to satisfy Rule 2019.109 It also noted that public 
access to court documents is favored in bankruptcy cases and 
that the denial of public access was only appropriate in very 
limited circumstances, which were not met in this case.110  
  
 103 Id. 
 104 See In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that “a 
judge must carefully and skeptically review sealing requests to insure that there really 
is an extraordinary circumstance of compelling need.”). Like Northwest, the official 
committee also pointed out that Owl Creek had already publicly disclosed the same 
information even though it was not required to do so under any SEC regulation. 
Northwest Official Committee Objection, supra note 90, at 6-7. 
 105 Bloomberg is currently the largest leading financial news and data 
company in the world. It reports on political, legal, financial and business events 
worldwide. 
 106 Bloomberg Motion to Intervene, supra note 90, at 1. The motion was “an 
effort to ensure that the public has a full and accurate understanding of the events 
occurring in this Chapter 11 proceeding, including the motivations and interests of the 
players who seek to control an important public company.” Id. 
 107 Bloomberg argued that there was a strong public interest in the role that 
hedge funds play in the financing of distressed companies, which could not be ignored. 
Bloomberg also noted that while hedge funds have become an important part of the 
U.S. economy, they have also been largely unregulated, and the public (including 
current and former employees of Northwest) had a critical interest in learning about 
the role that these funds would play in the reorganization of Northwest. Bloomberg 
ultimately stressed the importance of the disclosure, and the public harm that would 
result if the Rule 2019 statement were filed under seal. Id. at 2-3. 
 108 The U.S. trustee is responsible for overseeing the administration of 
bankruptcy cases and private trustees. 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2000). 
 109 U.S. Trustee Motion, supra note 90, at 6. 
 110 Id. at 6-9. The Trustee also concluded that before the court could order a 
seal, the ad hoc committee had to prove that the trading information constituted 
strategies that were confidential information or trade secrets, and that the public 
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3. The Court Decides Again: Disclosure Trumps Privacy 
After consideration of the parties’ motions and a hearing 
on the issue, Judge Gropper issued his ruling denying the ad 
hoc committee’s motion to file the disclosure statement under 
seal.111 The court rejected the argument that the committee 
members’ trading practices constituted commercial information 
under Section 107(b).112 It concluded that the committee’s 
contention that the information would allow its competitors to 
determine its trading strategies was unfounded.113 Additionally, 
the court pointed out that the Douglas Report considered the 
importance of public disclosure in drafting Rule 2019, which is 
inconsistent with filing the information under seal.114  
The court was especially critical of the fact that the 
committee members chose to act as a group to gain leverage in 
the reorganization proceedings, while simultaneously pointing 
to the possibility of individual financial losses that they may 
incur by revealing the information.115 Nevertheless, it concluded 
that even if the committee members had valid individual 
interests in keeping the information private, Congress had 
subordinated those interests to those advanced by Rule 2019.116 
For example, Rule 2019 is designed to protect equity holders 
who are not members of any committee and who rely on the 
disclosures to understand the motivations of the committee 
members.117 The court concluded that even if the ad hoc 
committee did not accept a fiduciary responsibility to the other 
shareholders, the purpose of Rule 2019 was to provide those 
shareholders with sufficient information so that they could 
decipher whether that committee would advance their 
interests, or whether they should form their own committee.118 
  
disclosure already made by Owl Creek did not remove them from the protection of 
Section 107(b). Id. 
 111 Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 112 Id. at 706-07.  
 113 Id. at 707. In fact, the court noted that at oral argument counsel agreed 
that the “trading strategies” of his clients were not at issue. Id. 
 114 Id. at 708. The Douglas Report stated that the information required by the 
rule would “provide a routine method of advising the court and all parties of interest of 
the actual economic interest of all persons participating in the proceedings.” Id. 
 115 Id. The court pointed out that by acting as a group, the committee 
members “subordinated to the requirements of Rule 2019 their interest in keeping 
private the prices at which they individually purchased or sold the Debtor’s securities.” 
Id. 
 116 Id. at 709. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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Overall, the disclosures also would allow all parties involved in 
the reorganization to assess the credibility of a group that 
would ultimately play an important role in the case.119  
The court pointed to two facts in the current case that 
emphasized the importance of Rule 2019 disclosures to the 
other shareholders.120 First, the ad hoc committee had already 
“disclosed that committee members own[ed] a very significant 
amount of [Northwest’s] debt, as well as stock.”121 The court 
concluded that shareholders had a right to know whether the 
debt and stock were purchased concurrently, which would raise 
issues about conflicts of interest.122 Second, three committee 
members had already admitted that they might sell their stock 
at any time, which would potentially leave other similarly 
situated shareholders without representation.123 The court 
noted that one function of Rule 2019 is to provide other 
members in a class “the right to know where their champions 
are coming from.”124  
After the court’s ruling denying the seal, three hedge 
funds that were members of the ad hoc committee filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the court’s initial decision.125 The 
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (“LSTA”), and the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(“SIFMA”) filed a brief in support of the motion arguing that 
the court’s decision would discourage many sophisticated 
stakeholders from participating in future bankruptcy cases.126 
The court denied this motion. Nine of the thirteen members of 
the ad hoc committee later complied with the court’s order and 
  
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. Based on these facts, the court concluded that “[g]ranting the motion to 
seal would scuttle the Rule.” Id. 
 125 Motion of Certain Equity Holders, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), FED. R. 
CIV. P. 59(e) and 60(b), and L.R. Bankr. P. 9023-1(a) for Reconsideration of 
Memorandum of Opinion and Order Granting Debtors’ Motion for an Order Compelling 
Ad Hoc Committee to File a Verified Statement Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), 
at 1, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-17930). 
 126 Joinder of Loan Syndications and Trading Association and Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association As Amici Curiae to Motion of Certain 
Equity Holders, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) and 60bB), and 
L.R. Bankr. P. 9023-1(a) for Reconsideration of Memorandum of Opinion and Order 
Granting Debtors’ Motion for an Order Compelling Ad Hoc Committee to File a 
Verified Statement Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), at 3, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 
701. 
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filed an amended statement providing the amount of stock they 
held, when the stock was purchased, and the amounts paid.127 
The remaining four members presumably dropped out of the 
case. 
B. In Re Scotia Development LLC: Hedge Funds Win 
Round II 
In January 2007, Scotia Pacific filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.128 
The ad hoc committee in Scopac (referred to as the “Noteholder 
Group”) was present from the beginning of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, and in February 2007, it filed a statement 
pursuant to Rule 2019.129 The equity held by the committee 
consisted of “timber notes,” which were traded publicly, but 
were secured obligations of Scopac.130 The statement filed by 
the committee included the names of the committee members 
and their aggregate note holdings, which totaled 90%.131 Like 
the original Rule 2019 statement in Northwest, it did not 
include detailed information about each committee member’s 
holdings, when they were acquired, or the price paid for the 
holdings.  
1. Scopac and the Noteholder Group Disagree 
In March 2007, not long after the final ruling in 
Northwest, Scopac filed a motion for an order compelling the ad 
hoc committee to disclose all the information required under 
Rule 2019(a).132 Scopac argued that Rule 2019 applied to the 
  
 127 Verified Amended Statement of the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security 
Holders Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), at 2, Exhibit A, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 
701.  
 128 Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for an Order Compelling the Ad Hoc 
Committee to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete and 
Proper Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 3, In re 
Scotia Dev. LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 
2007) [hereinafter Scopac Debtor’s Motion]. 
 129 Id. at 3, 7. 
 130 Id. at 4. 
 131 Verified Statement of Bingham McCutchen LLP and Gardere Wynne 
Sewell LLP Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 at 1-2, In re Scotia Development, 2007 
WL 2726902. 
 132 Scopac Debtor’s Motion, supra note 128, at 1. Scopac noted in its motion 
that while the committee claimed to currently represent 90% of the outstanding timber 
notes in its initial statement, at various times it also stated that it represented 97% 
and 99% of the notes, but no revised statement was ever received. Id. 
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committee since it admittedly represented the majority of note 
holders.133 It relied heavily on the recent Northwest decision, 
including the court’s conclusion about the history and purpose 
of Rule 2019.134 In addition, Scopac argued that unless the 
committee fully complied with the requirements of Rule 
2019(a), the court should prohibit it from further participation 
in the proceedings.135 
The Noteholder Group objected to Scopac’s motion, 
arguing that Rule 2019 did not apply to it for four reasons:  
(1) it was not a committee; (2) it did not represent any creditors 
or equity security holders; (3) it did not have any instrument; 
and (4) it was not empowered to act on behalf of creditors.136 
The Noteholder Group then addressed the purpose of Rule 
2019. It pointed to the Douglas Report137 and argued that it was 
meant to apply to protective committees that were organized 
and controlled by the debtor and other inside groups.138 It 
concluded that the term “committee” in Rule 2019 applied only 
to committees that were fiduciaries, and had the authority to 
bind the creditors they represented.139 Furthermore, it pointed 
out that nothing suggested that the Rule should apply to 
informal groups like theirs, which sought merely to share 
expenses, speak collectively and only represent the interests  
  
 133 Id. at 8-9. 
 134 See supra Part II.A. 
 135 Scopac Debtor’s Motion, supra note 128, at 11. 
 136 First, the Noteholder Group examined the legal definition of a “committee” 
and argued that it was merely a group, not a committee, since it was self-elected and 
did not speak for anyone other than itself. As a group, it argued that it was not a 
committee within the meaning of Rule 2019. Second, the Noteholder Group argued that 
it did not represent more than one creditor or equity security holder as required by 
Rule 2019. Again it looked to the legal definition of representative, which means 
someone who represents or has the authority to act for someone else. It pointed out 
that the members of the group did not represent anyone other than themselves. Third, 
the Noteholder Group argued that there was no instrument or agreement that specified 
the group’s authority to act on behalf of the note holders. Noteholder Group’s Objection 
to Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for an Order Compelling the ad Hoc 
Committee to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete and 
Proper Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 1-13, In re 
Scotia Development LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 
18, 2007) [hereinafter Noteholder Group Objection]. 
 137 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Douglas 
Report). 
 138 The Noteholder Group noted that in the post-Depression era, these 
protective committees often solicited deposit agreements from small investors, who as a 
result gave up control in the proceedings. Thus, Congress adopted the Rule because it 
wanted to control abusive behavior by protective committees, who were fiduciaries to 
the investors they represented. Noteholder Group Objection, supra note 136, at 13-14. 
 139 Id. at 16. 
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of the members in the group.140 The Noteholder Group also 
criticized Northwest, arguing that the court incorrectly inter-
preted the meaning of Rule 2019.141 
Scopac filed a response to the Noteholder Group’s objec-
tion, arguing that the plain language of the Rule applied.142 It 
pointed out that the group was in fact very similar to the  
ad hoc committee in Northwest because it filed a notice of 
appearance as a committee, retained counsel as a committee, 
compensated counsel as a committee, litigated issues in the 
bankruptcy proceedings as a committee, and gave instructions 
to counsel as a committee.143 Thus, Scopac concluded that the 
Noteholder Group could not argue that it was not a committee 
under the meaning of Rule 2019 solely to avoid disclosure.144 
Scopac also responded to the Noteholder Group’s 
arguments that it was not a fiduciary and no instrument 
existed that governed the group. It relied on Northwest for the 
proposition that a committee need not be a fiduciary to be 
required to comply with Rule 2019.145 Perhaps Scopac’s 
  
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 17. The Noteholder Group also argued that the Northwest decision 
was distinguishable in the following ways: (1) the ad hoc committee in Northwest, 
unlike the Noteholder Group, initially tried to be appointed as an official committee; (2) 
the Northwest committee held only 27% of the securities, but the Noteholder Group 
held 95% of the timber notes; (3) some of the members of the Northwest committee 
owned both stock and debt, but the members of the Noteholder Group owned nothing 
but timber notes; (4) the Northwest committee sought to negotiate for the entire class of 
shareholders whereas the Noteholder Group only represented themselves; (5) 
Northwest was insolvent and the shareholders were fighting for recovery, but Scopac 
was solvent and the note holders were entitled to full recovery; and (6) the court in 
Northwest concluded that public disclosure would provide information to the other 
shareholders, but the members of the Noteholder Group were the substantial majority 
of the note holders. Id. at 18-20. 
 142 Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Response to the Noteholder Group’s 
Objection to the Motion for an Order Compelling the Ad Hoc Committee to Fully 
Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete and Proper Verified 
Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 1-5, In re Scotia 
Development LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 
2007). Scopac pointed out that although the group had called itself a “committee” since 
March 2005, it changed its title to a “group” soon after the motion seeking disclosure 
under Rule 2019. Scopac argued that this naming convention was irrelevant since the 
Noteholder Group never changed anything other than its name, and continued to 
operate in the same way that it did since its formation. Id. 
 143 Id. at 1-2. 
 144 Id. at 2. 
 145 Scopac’s brief quoted the Northwest II court:  
I’m not saying that these individual funds can’t take action in their own 
interests; I’m just saying that Rule 2019 says that, if they’re a group that 
wants to affect this case—and they certainly do—that they’ve got to file 
certain basic information that I didn’t make up. I didn’t create the 
requirement. It’s on the books, it should be filed.  
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strongest argument for disclosure was that the timber notes 
held by the Noteholder Group were still publicly traded.146 As a 
result, if any member of the group sought to trade the timber 
notes, potential purchasers should have access to the infor-
mation required under Rule 2019 so that they could make 
relevant decisions about the group.147  
2. Friends of the Court Point Out the Implications of 
Disclosure 
Just as they had done in the Northwest case, the LSTA 
and the SIFMA filed an amicus curiae brief opposing Scopac’s 
motion. They argued that Rule 2019 disclosure would have 
“detrimental impacts” on the trading markets for distressed 
companies, as well as the willingness of sophisticated stake-
holders to participate in corporate bankruptcy proceedings.148 
They pointed out that the practical effect of compelling 
disclosure is that creditors would choose to act on their own 
instead of engaging in collective action, the former of which is 
more efficient and cost-effective for all parties involved in the 
reorganization proceedings.149 
3. The Court’s Decision: This Time Privacy Trumps 
Disclosure 
On April 18, 2007, Judge Richard Schmidt of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas 
issued an order denying Scopac’s motion to compel disclosure of 
the trading information that it alleged was required under 
Rule 2019.150 The order was two pages long and simply stated 
  
Id. at 6 (quoting Transcript of Motions on March 15, 2007 at 45, Northwest II, 363 B.R. 
704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-17930)). Scopac also argued that the absence of an 
instrument did not mean that the group did not fall under the Rule, which requires 
that “a verified [Rule 2019] statement include a copy of the [authorizing] instrument, if 
any . . . .” Id. at 8 (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019). 
 146 Id. at 12. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Motion of Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Loan 
Syndications and Trading Association for Leave of Court Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
1109(b) or, Alternatively, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2018(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), to Appear 
as Amici Curiae, File Brief and Make Oral Argument in Support of Noteholder Group’s 
Objection to Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for Order Compelling Ad Hoc 
Committee to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing Complete and 
Proper Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 2, In re 
Scotia Dev. LLC, Case No. 07-20027-C-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007). 
 149 Id. at 12-14. 
 150 In re Scotia Development, 2007 WL 2726902, at *1-2. 
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that the Noteholder Group was not a committee within the 
meaning of Rule 2019 and therefore the disclosure require-
ments of the Rule did not apply.151  
During the hearing on the Rule 2019 motion, Judge 
Schmidt elaborated a little more on his rationale. He reasoned 
that the Noteholder Group was not a committee but was 
merely a group of creditors represented by a single law firm.152 
He did point out, however, that there was an opportunity for 
conflicts of interest to arise among the group. As such, he noted 
that counsel for the Noteholder Group should ensure that 
everyone understood the potential conflicts and waived them 
accordingly.153 
Scopac filed a motion for reconsideration shortly after 
the initial denial; however, the court also denied this motion. 
During the hearings held on the reconsideration motion, Judge 
Schmidt noted that he made a “practical” decision: while the 
information that Scopac requested was important, it was far 
more important that such disclosure might negatively affect 
the trading market for distressed securities.154 He also 
concluded that the Northwest court’s interpretation of Rule 
  
 151 Id. 
 152 Transcript of Hearing on April 17, 2007 at 4-5, In re Scotia Dev. LLC, No. 
07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007). Judge Schmidt 
stated, “I’m going to take an approach, a practical approach, and find that is not a 
committee, that this is—at this point that this is just one law firm representing a 
bunch of creditors.” 
 153 Judge Schmidt stated: 
I think that he [counsel] needs to be also careful that his, and this is just, this 
is not a ruling, but I suspect that there could well be situations where his 
representation of this group of people could have some conflicts of interest. 
And thereby, it would be important that all of the parties that he represents 
understands those conflicts in order to waive them . . . . I’m not suggesting 
there are any at the present time. I’m just saying, obviously, if one of the 
claimants happen to have a large unsecured claim as well as a secured claim, 
there could be a conflict in the position taken with respect to—to all of his 
representation. 
Id. at 5. 
 154 Judge Schmidt stated: 
I suspect technically you should file the specific amounts of the claims of each 
of the—of your people you represent . . . . I know that this is one of those 
things that everybody finds important. I think it’s far more important in the 
sense of the impact it might have on the trading of claims and the distressed 
claims market. And that’s the reason I—I made sort of a practical decision 
when I made the decision. 
Transcript of Hearing on May 22, 2007 at 19, In re Scotia Development, 2007 WL 
2726902. 
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2019 was not what the drafters intended.155 In support of this 
conclusion, he noted that the Rule was enacted as a result of 
the Douglas Report, and the committees that existed then were 
not the same as the committees that exist today.156  
This decision appears to be inconsistent with Rule 2019. 
However, Judge Schmidt chose to ignore the plain meaning of 
the Rule in favor of a results-oriented decision that emphasized 
the effects on disclosure. Specifically, Judge Schmidt seemed 
especially concerned about the implications of disclosure on 
future claims trading. The next Part explores this tension 
between the transparency required under the Bankruptcy Code 
and the secrecy that is purportedly necessary for a functioning 
marketplace.  
III. THE RULE 2019 TENSION: TRANSPARENCY V. LIQUIDITY 
As the Northwest court held, Rule 2019 on its face 
applies to ad hoc committees. In addition, certain disclosures 
are necessary to achieve successful results in bankruptcy cases. 
However, applying the Rule in its current form to require 
disclosure of the complete trading history of committee 
members has implications on claims trading of distressed 
securities. This Part discusses the implications of the North-
west and Scopac decisions and concludes that they create a 
tension between transparency and liquidity. Additionally, it 
discusses and analyzes two Delaware cases that present a 
“middle ground” to help resolve this tension. This discussion 
will help to develop a framework for a proposed amendment to 
Rule 2019 in Part IV of this Note.157 
A. The Northwest Approach: The Implications of Disclosure 
The Northwest decision requires that each member of an 
ad hoc committee disclose the information specified in Rule 
2019. While disclosure is one of the hallmarks of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and is important to successful corporate 
  
 155 Id. at 19 (“In any event, I also understand that—that this is one of those 
things that—that, I mean, you can’t fault the reasoning of the New York Court. I just 
don’t think that was what was intended by the statute originally.”). 
 156 Id. (“I think the statute went back to the old Douglass group and whatever 
that—those—that group, the study of—of committees as they existed bank then, and 
not committee in the sense that we talk about them now. And so what’s [sic] why I sort 
of drew that line.”). 
 157 See infra Part IV. 
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reorganization,158 there are two other major implications to be 
considered. One is the effect that disclosure will have on 
liquidity in the trading markets for distressed claims and 
securities. The second is the effect that disclosure will have on 
the participation of experienced stakeholders, like hedge funds, 
in future bankruptcy litigation. These two implications were 
discussed in amici curiae briefs filed by the LSTA and the 
SIFMA in the Northwest and Scopac cases.159 Additionally, in 
Scopac, Judge Schmidt noted that while the committee was 
technically required to file individual disclosures, he made his 
decision because of the potential impact that disclosure would 
have on claims trading in the market for distressed 
securities.160 
1. Liquidity 
One of the major arguments against requiring dis-
closure is that it will decrease the liquidity of the trading 
markets for distressed claims. Liquidity refers to the ability to 
convert claims and securities by buying and selling.161 The 
trading of distressed claims is often beneficial to both the buyer 
and the seller.  
Buyers of distressed claims and equity seek to acquire 
securities in reorganizing debtors for various reasons. Unlike 
sellers, buyers view these claims as being undervalued and 
seek to gain by taking a risk on the investment.162 They are 
willing to purchase these claims and accept the risk because 
they feel that they understand the true value and can gain 
above-average returns. Many distressed investors sometimes 
hold debt in the company and seek to bundle these claims with 
the debt that they hold.163 Specifically, in our marketplace 
today, many hedge funds have begun making direct “second-
lien” loans to struggling companies and want to hedge their 
investment by acquiring equity in the company.164 They may 
  
 158 See supra Part I.B. 
 159 See supra note 126 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.2.  
 160 See supra note 154. 
 161 Forbes Media, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity 
.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2008). 
 162 Presentation by the Loan Syndications and Trading Association Contin-
uing Legal Education Seminar, Legal Issues and Trends Related to Claims Trading, at 
6, June 14, 2007 [hereinafter LSTA Presentation] (on file with author). 
 163 Id. 
 164 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2. 
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want to influence the reorganization process by taking an 
active role in the repayment plan or even by taking over the 
company.165 Since sellers are eager to get rid of their claims in 
light of the financial performance of the company, buyers can 
often obtain the debtor’s securities at significantly discounted 
prices.166 Despite the discounted prices at which they acquire 
distressed claims, investors like hedge funds can offer sellers 
much needed liquidity. 
On the other hand, sellers of distressed claims usually 
need cash immediately and cannot wait for the company to 
reorganize before receiving some kind of payment.167 The 
reorganization process is typically long, and it may take 
holders of claims some time before they receive consideration 
for their equity holdings. In fact, equity holders are unlikely to 
receive anything because they are the residual claimants. 
Additionally, sellers may not want to participate in the 
restructuring proceedings themselves, which are expensive and 
timely.168 Specifically, active participation in restructuring 
cases sometimes requires significant expenses such as counsel 
and litigation fees. Sellers may value liquidity when they need 
money to meet their own debt obligations or to pay current 
creditors or employees. The financial affairs of the company 
may also lead sellers to believe that the claims they hold are 
overvalued, and thus they may want to “cash out” before the 
value of their investment decreases even more.169  
In particular, many institutional investors like insur-
ance companies and pension plans are forced to quickly dispose 
of distressed securities because their portfolio holdings are 
often subject to credit quality and rating limitations.170 
Alternatively, the seller may also be a customer or supplier 
who has a valuable relationship with the debtor and does not 
want to jeopardize that long-term relationship by participating 
in what might turn out to be an antagonistic bankruptcy 
case.171 Overall, for a variety of reasons, sellers of distressed 
claims want out, and they want out relatively quickly. Though 
  
 165 LSTA Presentation, supra note 162, at 6. 
 166 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2. 
 167 LSTA Presentation, supra note 162, at 6. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2. 
 171 Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed 
Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
191, 207 (2005). 
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this generally leads to a discounted selling price, sellers are 
willing to accept this in light of their motivations. They value 
the liquidity that distressed investors provide to the market 
because it allows them to accomplish their goals. 
Disclosure under the Northwest approach threatens this 
liquidity because the majority of distressed investors are hedge 
funds that rely on secrecy for their success.172 Hedge funds are 
specifically formed in such a way as to avoid regulations that 
require them to disclose how they conduct their business.173 
More than anything, they seek to keep their trading infor-
mation private. If forced to disclose this information, including 
the price and date that they acquired their claims, it is highly 
possible that hedge funds will no longer invest in distressed 
claims and securities. This decrease in the trading markets will 
in turn prevent holders of distressed claims from liquidating 
their claims prior to the conclusion of the bankruptcy case.  
2. Participation in Bankruptcy Proceedings 
The second implication of disclosure is that it will 
provide a disincentive for hedge funds to actively participate in 
bankruptcy cases. It is important to note that hedge funds may 
continue to participate but simply choose not to join ad hoc 
committees. However, this may very well mean that small 
hedge funds will refrain from participating altogether for fear 
that they would not be able to afford the litigation costs. The 
implication of disclosure on participation is therefore twofold.  
First, disclosure under Rule 2019 discourages hedge 
funds from forming ad hoc committees and participating 
collectively in bankruptcy cases since individual creditors are 
not required to comply with the Rule.174 This will lead to 
inefficiencies and cause delays in the resolution of cases since 
debtors will be forced to negotiate with individual creditors, 
rather than with all of them as a group.175 It may seem that 
individual creditors are the only ones who benefit from the 
  
 172 See supra Part I.A. 
 173 See supra Part I.A. 
 174 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019 (specifying that only “committees” or “entities” 
are required to comply with the rule). 
 175 Evan D. Flaschen & Kurt A. Mayr, Ad Hoc Committees and the Misuse of 
Rule 2019, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 (2007). (“[T]he quickest and most effective 
reorganizations are typically accomplished on a consensual basis, and debtors should 
welcome the participation of a sophisticated group of creditors that collectively has 
substantial voting power rather than seeking to fight those creditors at every turn.”). 
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formation of ad hoc committees because they can share litiga-
tion costs and exert greater influence on the case. However, 
collective participation benefits both creditors and debtors 
because it prevents delays and duplication of efforts.176 In 
addition, because ad hoc committees can pool their resources  
to cover litigation expenses, they can retain experienced, 
sophisticated professionals to negotiate with debtors. If certain 
creditors are discouraged from participating in ad hoc commit-
tees and forced to act individually, they may no longer have the 
financial resources to retain these professionals, who arguably 
bring more expertise to the cases and help negotiate more 
effective reorganization plans for both parties.  
Second, disclosure discourages participation by smaller 
hedge funds because of the time and expense required. One of 
the reasons that creditors form ad hoc committees is in an 
effort to share the litigation expenses.177 Some small investors 
may not have the resources to retain counsel and incur the 
litigation expenses, whereas others may simply choose not to 
do so because the expense outweighs the benefit based on their 
stake in the company. As a result, these creditors will 
essentially have their interests restructured by larger creditors 
who can afford to participate in the case. The LSTA and 
SIFMA argue that this result is contrary to the broader intent 
of enacting Rule 2019, which was to prevent the investors from 
having their claims restructured on terms that were negotiated 
by larger stakeholders, who did not adequately represent their 
interests.178  
B. The Scopac Approach: The Implications of  
Non-Disclosure 
The Scopac decision does not require that each member 
of an ad hoc committee disclose the information required by 
  
 176 Whereas debtors only had to negotiate with representatives acting on 
behalf of a group of creditors, if hedge funds choose not to form ad hoc committees to 
avoid disclosure, debtors will be forced to negotiate with counsel for each individual 
creditor. Coordination is extremely beneficial in reorganization cases. As the Seventh 
Circuit stated in another context, “coordination is especially common in bankruptcy, 
which often is described as a collective proceeding among lenders.” United Airlines v. 
U.S. Bank, 406 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 177 Eisenbach, supra note 77. 
 178 Brief of Amici Curiae of Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association and Loan Syndications and Trading Association at 8, In re Scotia Dev. 
LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007). 
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Rule 2019.179 Instead, it allows ad hoc committees to simply  
file a statement identifying the members of the committee  
and stating the aggregate claims held by its members.180 Prior 
to the recent Rule 2019 litigation, ad hoc committees usually 
provided this information on a voluntary basis.181 As discussed 
in Part II.B.3, supra, the Scopac court’s decision was motivated 
by the potential impact that disclosure would have on claims 
trading. The LSTA and SIFMA also filed amici curiae briefs in 
that case and testified during the hearings that the two main 
implications of disclosure are the effects on liquidity in the 
distressed securities market and participation in bankruptcy 
cases. However, while these implications are important, the 
Scopac decision has implications of its own. Specifically, while 
liquidity is important, transparency is equally important in 
bankruptcy cases in order to ensure an effective reorganization. 
This Part argues that the Scopac decision does not adequately 
consider the importance of transparency in bankruptcy cases. 
There are two main implications of not requiring disclosure 
from individual committee members. First, non-disclosure has 
the potential to result in an uneven playing field for the parties 
of interest in a bankruptcy case. Second, it prevents the debtor, 
and other parties involved in the case, from understanding the 
motivations of the ad hoc committee, exposing the debtor and 
others to potential harms.  
1. An Even Playing Field 
An “even playing field” is where all parties involved in 
bankruptcy litigation are held to the same standards. The first 
potential consequence of non-disclosure is that it can create an 
uneven playing field because it allows members of the ad hoc 
committee to participate without meeting disclosure require-
ments. Transparency is the very essence of bankruptcy 
proceedings, and by not holding hedge funds to this standard, 
the scales are tipped in their favor. Regular participants in 
bankruptcy cases have borne this burden of full disclosure in 
order to reap the benefits of participation. For example, if 
debtors want to reap the benefits of the automatic stay as well 
as the ability to discharge their debts, they must disclose all 
  
 179 See supra Part II.B. 
 180 See supra Part II.B. 
 181 See supra Part I.B for discussion of Rule 2019 litigation prior to the 
Northwest and Scopac cases. 
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pertinent information, including assets, liabilities, and busi-
ness affairs.182 Their management is also subject to scrutiny so 
that creditors can make an informed decision about their plan 
of reorganization.183 If secured lenders want to reap the benefits 
of debtor-in-possession lending or exit financing, court approval 
is required and other creditors have an opportunity to object.184 
Similarly, ad hoc committees who want to reap the benefits of 
collective participation should bear the burden of complying 
with the disclosure rules and accepting a fiduciary obligation to 
the class that they represent.185 Under the Scopac approach, ad 
hoc committees are allowed to ignore their burden of disclosure 
under Rule 2019, while still reaping the benefits of partici-
pation.  
2. Potential Harms to Other Parties 
One party that may be harmed by non-disclosure is the 
group of other creditors or equity holders in the class. For 
example, in Northwest, the ad hoc committee only held about 
27% of the shares in the company. The other outstanding 
shareholders represented other equity holders in the class. As 
discussed in Part II.A, supra, the court in Northwest was 
concerned about harm to these shareholders if the ad hoc 
committee was not forced to comply with Rule 2019.  
Non-disclosure can harm the other shareholders in a 
number of ways. First, it prevents them from being able to 
assess the motivations of the committee. The dates that the 
committee members purchased their claims and the price at 
which they acquired them will allow the other creditors to 
understand their goals in the bankruptcy case. For example,  
in Northwest, it was disclosed that some of the committee 
members held both debt and equity in the company.186 Rule 
2019 disclosure allows shareholders to determine whether such 
debt and equity claims are purchased at around the same time, 
which may be evidence of a conflict of interest.187  
Second, non-disclosure prevents other creditors from 
making informed decisions as to whether an ad hoc committee 
  
 182 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000); see also Berman, supra note 39, at 64. 
 183 Berman, supra note 39, at 64. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 187 See supra text accompanying notes 121-122. 
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will adequately represent their interests or if they should form 
a committee of their own. For example, if the Northwest share-
holders were not aware that some of the committee members 
owned both debt and equity, they may have mistakenly 
believed that the ad hoc committee represented their interests 
since they were in the same class. 
Third, non-disclosure of subsequent sales of claims 
prevents the other creditors from knowing when a committee 
member is no longer involved in the case. If the committee 
members are allowed to sell their claims without disclosure, 
this may leave other creditors who thought that the committee 
was representing their interests without representation. For 
example, in Northwest it was disclosed that several members of 
the committee intended to sell their claims.188 Rule 2019 would 
force the committee members to disclose subsequent sales of 
the claims and keep everyone informed. Non-disclosure of this 
information would have allowed committee members to sell 
their claims and leave the bankruptcy negotiations, which 
could leave other shareholders without representation. 
Another party that may be harmed by non-disclosure is 
the debtor. The debtor, like other parties in a bankruptcy case, 
needs to know with whom they are negotiating. The debtor 
cannot effectively negotiate with the committee unless it 
understands its individual members and their holdings in the 
company. For example, in the Northwest case, the ad hoc 
committee filed a notice of appearance and immediately began 
serving document subpoenas and notices of depositions to 
parties involved in the case.189 The ad hoc committee sought 
specific information regarding the debtor, including valuations, 
potential mergers, consolidations, and other sales involving the 
debtor.190 The debtor, however, had no information about the 
committee members or their holdings, which led the debtor to 
file the motion requesting disclosure under Rule 2019.191 
C. The Owens Corning Approach: A Middle Ground 
While the option of allowing creditors to file their Rule 
2019 disclosures under seal was rejected by the Northwest 
court, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
  
 188 Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 189 Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 7. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
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Delaware was more receptive to this approach. In In re Owens 
Corning, Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald was the first to institute a 
procedure designed to require disclosure while still protecting 
creditors’ privacy rights.192 She allowed parties to file their Rule 
2019 disclosure statements privately. Information submitted to 
the court was unavailable on the public docket, and a party 
seeking to obtain the information had to receive the court’s per-
mission.193 Several parties challenged the order, arguing that 
they were entitled to the information under Rule 2019, that it 
should have been made public, and that it was inappropriate to 
require court permission for access to Rule 2019 statements.194 
Judge Fitzgerald defended her order on the ground that it 
adequately balanced the privacy rights of creditors with the 
public’s competing interest in full disclosure.195  
This identical approach was followed by the bankruptcy 
court in In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp. and later upheld by the 
Delaware district court.196 The parties challenging the bank-
ruptcy court’s decision argued that the procedure unfairly 
restricted their rights to access the information.197 They also 
argued that it required them to incur additional expenses to 
access the information disclosed under Rule 2019 since they 
had to file a motion before the bankruptcy court.198 The district 
court disagreed stating that the purpose of Rule 2019 was “to 
ensure that plans of reorganization are negotiated and voted 
upon by people who are authorized to act on behalf of the real 
parties in interest.”199 Therefore, it concluded that the bank-
ruptcy court had struck an appropriate balance between 
complying with the requirements of the Rule and considering 
the complexities of the case.200  
These Delaware court decisions present another alter-
native for the current Rule 2019 conflict: filing the Rule 2019 
  
 192 Heightened Rule 2019 Disclosure Obligations for Committee Members after 
Decisions in Northwest Airlines and Owens Corning, ABI COMMITTEE NEWS, Apr. 2007 
(citing In re Owens Corning, No. 00-3837 (Bankr. D. Del.)). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. Judge Fitzgerald explained her ruling as follows: “This order, in my 
view, does everything and probably more than it needs to do. It provides for protection 
of the parties’ rights to ask us [for] this information by simply filing a motion with this 
Court telling me why you want it . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
 196 See In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 327 B.R. 554 (D. Del. 2005).  
 197 Id. at 557. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 559. 
 200 Id.  
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disclosures with the court under seal. It is noteworthy that 
these cases did not specifically allow filing under seal. The 
information was removed from the electronic docket, but 
parties could still obtain access by filing a motion with the 
court and obtaining an order.201 However, the reasoning 
employed by the court in devising this procedure is similar to 
the arguments that were presented by the ad hoc committee in 
the Northwest case when it sought to make its Rule 2019 
disclosures under seal.202  
At first glance, the approach seems to be a compromise 
or a “middle ground”—the committee would be required to 
comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019, but it 
could avoid having its confidential trading information made 
public. However, allowing hedge funds to file their trading 
information with courts under seal is an ineffective approach 
for the following three reasons. First, as discussed above, one of 
the aims of the disclosure Rule is to ensure that everyone 
involved in the case has access to the information. Second, the 
argument that trading information constitutes “confidential 
trade secrets” is unconvincing. As the debtor in Northwest 
pointed out, the information required under the Rule is 
historical information that is currently required under existing 
SEC regulations.203 Finally, there is a valid concern that this 
information should be available not only to the parties involved 
in the case, but also to the public.  
1. Access to the Information 
The seal would allow the committee members to submit 
the information required under Rule 2019 to the court, but 
keep it from other parties involved in the litigation. In 
Northwest, the ad hoc committee sought to make its trading 
information available only to the court and the U.S. Trustee.204 
The committee members wanted to keep the information from 
the public, from the debtor, and from all other creditors and 
equity holders.205 This simply overlooks the fact that Rule 2019 
is an integral part of the disclosure scheme of the Bankruptcy 
  
 201  Id. at 560. 
 202  See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
 203  See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
 204 Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at 14. 
 205 Id. 
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Code.206 One of the purposes of the Rule is to ensure that 
reorganization plans are negotiated both openly and fairly 
among all creditors.207 By not allowing all parties that are 
participating in the case to have access to the information, 
filing under seal seems to run contrary to this purpose of the 
Rule. Disclosure is important to both the debtors so that they 
can effectively negotiate with the committee, and to the other 
creditors to prevent them from being harmed by conflicts of 
interest. While Rule 2019(b) provides courts with discretion as 
to what sanctions they can impose for noncompliance, the 
requirements with respect to the information to be provided 
and filing procedures under Rule 2019(a) do not allow for 
discretion.208 There are no exceptions that would allow a 
committee to file its information with the court under seal. 
2. Trade Secrets 
The ad hoc committee in Northwest argued that a sealed 
2019 statement was justified because the trading information 
required under Rule 2019 constituted trade secrets protected 
by Section 107(b) of the Code.209 It argued that its members 
trade their securities using complex strategies that comprise 
proprietary, confidential, and commercial information.210 This 
Note argues that the court made the correct decision in 
rejecting this argument. The information to be reported under 
Rule 2019 is far from complex trading strategies. It is factual, 
historical trading data, including the prices and dates on which 
claims were purchased and subsequently traded by the hedge 
funds.211 The Rule does not seek disclosure of any hedge fund 
policies, models, investment strategies, or practices. In fact,  
the information required is usually available publicly for 
companies that are subject to SEC regulations.212 While hedge 
  
 206 See supra Part I.B for background information about Rule 2019 and its 
purpose in the Bankruptcy Code. 
 207 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, at §2019.01. 
 208 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019.  
 209 Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at 5-6. 
 210 Id. 
 211  Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 14. 
 212 For example, Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
requires certain disclosure for investors who obtain more than 5% of a class of publicly 
traded securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006). This and other federal securities rules and 
regulations require full disclosure based on the premise that “transparency promotes 
fair and efficient markets and market practices.” Northwest Debtors Objection, supra 
note 69, at 15.  
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funds seek to maintain their privacy and ensure they do not 
fall under these regulations, these efforts do not turn this 
routine trading information into proprietary trade secrets. 
Additionally, bankruptcy rules, if they plainly apply, should 
not be ignored to cater to a hedge fund’s preferred business 
practices.  
3. Public Access 
Allowing an ad hoc committee to file its disclosure 
statement under seal would prevent public access to the 
information. When a public company files for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, other parties are affected, including employees 
and pensioners. For example, in the Northwest case, the 
bankruptcy proceeding affected 30,000 employees, as well as 
potentially tens of thousands of other pensioners.213 Allowing 
disclosure under seal would prevent these stakeholders from 
understanding the motivations of a committee that could play 
an important role in the restructuring of the company. In 
addition, Northwest was a large, well-known airline serving 
nearly 250 cities and 50 million passengers annually, and thus 
what happened to the company was a matter of general public 
interest.214 
IV. THE SOLUTION: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 2019 
This Part proposes that Congress should amend Rule 
2019 to strike a better balance between requiring adequate 
disclosures in bankruptcy proceedings and maintaining hedge 
fund investment in distressed claims. First, this Part argues 
that while there is a need for greater consistency in Rule 2019 
litigation, judges should also have some discretion to evaluate 
committees based on the circumstances presented in a given 
case. This can be accomplished through a combination of 
outcome-determinative rules and standards.215 This Part will 
use the “rules versus standards” approach in constructing a 
change to Rule 2019, which will be presented in three parts: 
the factors that should be considered when determining 
  
 213 Bloomberg Motion to Intervene, supra note 90, at 1-2. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing, 
7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105, 119 (1999) (discussing the “rules” versus “standards” 
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whether or not the Rule applies, the information that must be 
disclosed under the Rule, and the sanctions that should be 
imposed for noncompliance. 
A. A Delicate Balance: The Need for Consistency and the 
Need for Discretion 
There is a general need for “consistency and certainty” 
in bankruptcy litigation.216 The Northwest and Scopac decisions 
were clearly divergent and thus created uncertainty about the 
future of Rule 2019 litigation. Both courts had to decide 
whether or not the Rule should apply to the respective ad hoc 
committees based on factors that they considered important. 
This divergence is partly attributable to the fact that the 
current Rule does not contemplate the nature of committees 
today and partly because it does not adequately address the 
various factors that should be considered in determining who 
should disclose. In crafting a rule that achieves consistency, it 
is necessary to allow judges some discretion. Bankruptcy 
reorganization practices are constantly evolving; the recent 
emergence of hedge funds as active participants in these 
proceedings is an example of this. As new controversial issues 
emerge, Rule 2019 must allow bankruptcy judges to exercise 
discretion to give them the flexibility necessary to effectively 
adapt to new circumstances. 
This Note advocates an approach that both promotes 
consistency and allows judges to react to developments in the 
financial markets through a careful application of the “rules 
versus standards approach.” Rules and standards are two 
techniques that are often used to channel judicial discretion.217 
The proposed solution to the Rule 2019 conflict employs a 
combination of rules and standards for judges to follow when 
deciding cases. 
A rule mandates or guides conduct or action in a given 
type of situation.218 Rules are outcome determinative and 
require the decision-maker to categorize or classify issues.219 
  
 216 John W. Myers II, Bankruptcy—Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash: The 
Valuation Controversy Is Over—Almost, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1025, 1039 (1998) (stating 
that the Supreme Court accepted a case “because of the need for consistency and 
certainty in the bankruptcy process”). 
 217 Williams, supra note 215, at 119 (“Rules and standards are tools for 
channeling the discretion of a decision-maker.”). 
 218 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (6th ed. 1990). 
 219 Williams, supra note 215, at 119. 
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They “promote consistency, predictability, and judicial 
restraint in decision making.”220 They effectively provide future 
litigants with notice of how an issue is to be decided.221 
However, rules do not allow the decision-maker to adapt the 
law to special circumstances that may arise.222 They simply 
require application of the law to a set of facts to produce a 
result. 
On the other hand, standards are indeterminate and 
require the decision-maker to weigh competing interests.223 
They are more flexible than rules and allow a judge more 
discretion in deciding an issue.224 Allowing more discretion, 
though, increases the risk of error due to bias or incompe-
tence.225 While rules and standards each have advantages and 
limitations, one or the other may be preferable in setting up a 
statutory scheme, depending on the purpose of the legislative 
action and the degree of decision-maker discretion that is 
desirable.  
In the context of Rule 2019 litigation, the best approach 
would use a combination of rules and standards to promote 
consistency but still allow judges to weigh different factors on a 
case-by-case basis. With respect to disclosure, the current Rule 
2019 takes a purely rule-based approach without the use of any 
standards. The single question is whether or not Rule 2019 
applies, but there are no guidelines to help a court answer this 
question. This is likely because when the Rule was enacted, it 
applied to protective committees, which were the only type of 
committee that existed at the time.226 Currently, there are so 
many participants in bankruptcy cases that committees come 
in many shapes and sizes. In response, judges who believe that 
a committee should not have to disclose all the information 
required under the Rule simply conclude that the committee is 
not covered under Rule 2019.227 How they arrive at this 
  
 220 Id. at 120. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 121 (“A rule is perceived as the death of thought.”). 
 223 Id. at 119. 
 224 Id. at 121. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See supra Part I.B (discussing the Douglas Report). Protective committees 
solicited deposit agreements from individual creditors and controlled their claims 
during a reorganization. Id. Because of the nature of these committees and because 
they were the only unofficial committees that existed at the time, there was no need for 
judges to decide whether or not the Rule applied.  
 227  For example, in Scopac, Judge Schmidt was concerned about the impact of 
disclosure on the trading markets. See supra note 154. He therefore concluded that the 
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decision, however, is left to their discretion. While the nature of 
bankruptcy cases requires judges to have some discretion to 
decide the Rule 2019 issue, there is also a need to have clear 
rules for certain aspects of the decision to promote fairness and 
prevent uncertainty. As such, the solution presented is a 
combination of rules and standards. 
B. The Structure of the Rule 
There are essentially three questions to be answered in 
applying the proposed rule. First, is the particular committee 
in question required to disclose under the rule? If the answer is 
no, then the inquiry ends. If the answer is yes, then the second 
question is: what information is that committee required to 
disclose? And finally, what are the consequences or sanctions 
for failure to disclose the required information?  
Under this framework, the first question suggests a 
“standards” approach. Since the participants and stakeholders 
in bankruptcy proceedings can change at any time, the nature 
of committees can also change. As such, a pure rule-based 
approach would not be able to adapt to new scenarios or 
complications that may arise. However, the standard will not 
give judges complete discretion. Rather, it will provide several 
factors that the court should consider and weigh in deciding 
whether or not the committee is required to disclose.  
The second and third questions are rule-based 
approaches. Once the court has decided that the committee 
falls under the rule and must disclose, the question of what 
should be disclosed is not open for interpretation or discretion 
by the court. The rule will provide for specific disclosures that 
must be made. Similarly, the sanctions that should be imposed 
for noncompliance are clearly stated to prevent courts from 
using it as an “out.” As long as a committee is required to 
disclose, and chooses not to, the court cannot excuse it from 
sanctions for any reason. This is to ensure consistency and 
fairness in the application of the rule, and to preserve its 
integrity. 
  
Noteholder Group was not a “committee” within the meaning of the Rule. In re Scotia 
Dev. LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902, at *1-2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 
2007). 
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C. Question 1: Is Disclosure Necessary? 
The first—and arguably most important—question is 
whether or not disclosure is required by a particular com-
mittee. This decision should not be left to the complete 
discretion of the judge. Instead, certain factors relating to the 
circumstances of the case and the members of the committee 
should be considered. The following three factors are perhaps 
the most important: the aggregate holdings of the committee 
members, whether the committee members hold both debt and 
equity in the debtor company, and whether the claims were 
acquired pre-bankruptcy or post-bankruptcy. These factors 
provide judges with a roadmap to guide their inquiry into 
whether the committee should be required to disclose. 
Though the factors are independent of each other, they 
do not all have to line up for a court to decide a certain way. 
The court can use its discretion to weigh each factor depending 
on the circumstances of the case.228 For example, a court can 
find that a committee holds 100% of a company’s stock and 
acquired all of its claims pre-bankruptcy but still require 
disclosure because the committee holds significant debt in the 
company in addition to the stock. Similarly, a committee does 
not have to meet all three factors to escape disclosure under 
the rule. These factors merely guide the court through issues 
that should be considered, but allows them to weigh one or two 
factors more strongly when making their decision.229 While this 
may lead to some inconsistency, the nature of bankruptcy 
litigation calls for some flexibility in the rules.230 Without 
  
 228 This discretionary weighing can be analogized to the “Delaware Block 
Approach” that is used in the corporate context to value businesses. Under this 
method, the court uses three different values: values for net assets, earnings, and 
market price. It gives a weight to each, and then adds them together. The weight given 
to each element varies from case to case and is discretionary depending on the business 
being valued. This weighing process may be outcome determinative. See Piemonte v. 
New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Mass. 1979).  
 229  This weighing technique is currently used in the “Delaware Block 
Approach” where the court assigns a weight to each of the valuation techniques based 
on the case before them. Id. In the Rule 2019 context, the courts would decide which 
factors should be weighed more prominently based on the committee before them. For 
example, if a committee held a majority of the class of claims, this would favor non-
disclosure. However, this factor may be weighed less than the other two factors if the 
committee purchased all their claims post-bankruptcy and owned both debt and equity 
in the company. 
 230  The recent emergence of hedge funds as active participants in bankruptcy 
litigation is an example of why flexibility is required. Rule 2019 was drafted to apply 
primarily to protective committees, which are now a thing of the past. See supra Part 
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allowing this discretion, the rule may end up being over-
inclusive or under-inclusive, and thus ineffective.231 At the very 
least, this approach provides a framework for judges so that 
they are all considering the same types of factors in making 
their decisions. It also provides notice to investors, including 
hedge funds, of what types of inquiries will be made by the 
court when a Rule 2019 motion is being decided. 
1. Aggregate Holdings 
One of the factors that should be considered is the 
aggregate holdings of the committee.232 This information would 
allow the court to figure out what percentage of the total 
holdings is held by the committee. If a committee holds a vast 
majority of a particular class of securities, the potential for 
harm to other similarly situated creditors is minimal. For 
example, the ad hoc committee in Northwest held only 27% of 
the outstanding stock in the debtor company, whereas in 
Scopac the ad hoc committee held 95% of the timber notes.233 
Comparing these two particular cases tends to oversimplify the 
inquiry because 27% versus 95% is a big difference. However, if 
a court had a committee that represented 60%, for example, the 
inquiry is not as easy.  
To provide a structure for evaluating committees based 
on their investment in the debtor, this Note suggests the 
following categorization. First, if a committee represents less 
than 50% of the total outstanding claims or securities, the 
  
I.B. As such, bankruptcy rules should be drafted with an appropriate balance of 
achieving consistency and allowing for flexibility. 
 231  Without allowing judges some discretion and a clear framework for 
deciding whether a particular committee should be subject to the rule, judges will 
either require disclosure or ignore the rule altogether, depending on what they think 
the outcome of the case should be. Judges would be in the best position to apply the 
rule effectively if there were specific factors to consider and they had the discretion to 
weigh each factor depending on the facts of a case. 
 232 This was one of the factors discussed by the Northwest court in Part II.A, 
supra. This Part argues that the court was correct in considering this factor when 
deciding whether or not disclosure was required. 
 233 See Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); Noteholder 
Group Objection, supra note 136, at 1. This difference in holdings is significant for the 
following reason. In Northwest, 73% of the stockholders were potentially unrepresented 
in the bankruptcy case. Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 708. Allowing the ad hoc committee 
to proceed without disclosure could therefore harm an extremely large percentage of 
stockholders. However, in Scopac, only five percent of the note holders were not 
represented by the committee. Noteholder Group Objection, supra note 136, at 1. In 
that case, allowing the committee to proceed without disclosure could only potentially 
harm a small percentage of the note holders.  
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assumption is that they should be required to disclose. Such  
a committee’s overall holdings are not a majority, and the 
interests of other creditors, which represent a substantial 
percentage of the outstanding claims, should be protected. 
Second, if a committee represents more than 90% of the total 
outstanding claims or securities, the assumption is that they 
are not required to disclose. Such a committee represents an 
overwhelming majority of that class of investments, and there 
is a very small percentage of other creditors who may be 
harmed by the committee’s actions. Finally, if a committee 
represents between 50% and 90% of the outstanding claims or 
securities, the court may not make any assumptions about 
disclosure using this factor alone. The court should consider 
the aggregate holdings in light of the other factors under this 
part of the rule in making its decision. Aggregate holdings 
alone will not be sufficient to either require disclosure or avoid 
disclosure. 
2. Debt and Equity Investments 
Another factor that should be considered by the court is 
whether the committee members participate in more than one 
level of the debtor’s capital structure. When committee 
members own both debt and equity in a company, serious 
conflicts of interest issues are implicated.234 For example, if the 
debt and equity were purchased around the same time, this 
raises an issue about the motivations of the committee member 
and warns other stakeholders accordingly. Purchasing debt 
and equity concurrently suggests that the investor is solely 
interested in maximizing profits. The committee may make 
decisions that minimize or reduce its recovery for one type of 
investment while balancing this loss by maximizing its 
recovery on the other investment. This strategy will allow it to 
gain overall, but will potentially harm other creditors whose 
sole recovery depends on the first investment.235 The general 
  
 234 See supra Part II.A where the Northwest court also considered this factor 
when making its decision. Several of the committee members admitted to owning a 
significant amount of debt in the company in addition to the shares. The court 
concluded that this created a conflict of interest, and the Rule 2019 disclosures were 
necessary for the other creditors in the class to make decisions.  
 235 The Douglas Report discussed in Part I.B, supra, identified this problem, 
which already existed in the 1930s. Although contemporary committees are unlike 
protective committees of that era, Douglas identified problems that have implications 
today. Parties that hold both debt and equity in the same company have inherent 
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idea is that inherent conflicts exist when committee members 
have alternate interests or motivations that can affect the 
other members of the class.  
Unlike the aggregate holdings factor, this factor is a 
bright-line issue and does not require a judge’s discretion. The 
inquiry is a simple one: committee members either own both 
debt and equity or they do not. If they own both debt and 
equity, the court should favor disclosure, but if they do not own 
both debt and equity, the court should favor non-disclosure. As 
discussed previously, this factor is only one in a series that will 
be considered collectively. It does not operate independently in 
the overall question of whether disclosure is required. For 
instance, a committee may own both debt and equity, but own 
95% of either the debt or the equity. Though the debt and 
equity factor on its own favors disclosure, the court should 
balance all the factors in making its decision.236 
3. Pre-Bankruptcy or Post-Bankruptcy 
The final factor to be considered is whether the claims 
were acquired pre-bankruptcy or post-bankruptcy. The goal of 
this factor is to uncover the motivations and intentions of the 
committee in the bankruptcy proceedings. For example, claims 
that are acquired while a company is in bankruptcy will likely 
be acquired at a discounted price, whereas claims that have 
been previously acquired may have been purchased at or 
around face value. A committee member who has purchased a 
claim for less than face value may be motivated to accept 
recovery that will not fully compensate someone who has 
purchased at face value.237 Understanding the timeline would 
  
conflicts of interest, just like the bondholders who served on stockholder committees in 
the 1930s.  
 236  For example, consider a committee that owns 95% of the outstanding stock 
in a debtor company and the committee members own both debt and equity. Under the 
first factor, the potential for harm to other similarly situated creditors is small. This 
factor favors non-disclosure since only 5% of the class of creditors is unrepresented. On 
the other hand, the second factor would favor disclosure because of the potential for 
conflicts of interest among the committee members. The court would weigh these two 
factors (along with the third factor discussed in the next part) to decide whether or not 
disclosure is warranted. In a case like this, the court may decide that disclosure is not 
warranted because although the committee members own both debt and equity, they 
own 95% of the outstanding stock and there is little potential for harm to other parties. 
 237 See supra Part I.B. This factor was also derived from the results of the 
Douglas Report. As discussed in Part I.B, Douglas was concerned about the 
hypothetical case where some committee members had acquired their interests at low 
prices, and others had acquired it at par value. The pre-versus-post bankruptcy 
purchase will identify whether this conflict may exist and factor it into the decision. 
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expose the motivations of committee members and allow other 
creditors who may be harmed to protect themselves. This is 
another bright-line factor. If the claims were acquired before 
the case was filed, it would favor non-disclosure. However, if 
the claims were acquired during the bankruptcy case, it would 
favor disclosure.  
4. Summary of Factors 
These three factors all seek to divulge different 
categories of information that will play a role in the court’s 
ultimate decision: position, conflicts, and motivations. The 
aggregate holdings of the committee indicate the overall 
percentage of the class that it represents, and therefore its 
position among the other creditors. The debt and equity 
investments implicate potential conflicts of interest based on 
investments in more than one tier of the debtor’s capital 
structure. Finally, the pre-bankruptcy versus post-bankruptcy 
issue exposes the motivations of the committee or committee 
members. If taken together, these three factors should provide 
the court with sufficient information to help it decide whether 
disclosure is warranted.238 As stated previously, the court 
should exercise its discretion in weighing these factors to reach 
its decision. If the court decides that a committee should not be 
subject to the disclosure rules, the inquiry ends. If the court 
decides that disclosure is warranted, it moves to the second 
part of the analysis. 
D. Question 2: What Information Is Required? 
The second part of the analysis is a rule-based 
approach. If the court decides that disclosure is warranted for a 
particular committee, this section applies and the committee 
members must disclose all the information required under the 
rule. The court does not have the discretion to tailor the 
requirements on a case-by-case basis. Thus, if a court decides 
  
Though the dynamics of bankruptcy cases are different today, the main concern that 
Douglas had was that ulterior motives, conflicts of interest and self-serving actions 
would cause committees to take advantage of others. This concern is still valid today 
and should be considered by the court. 
 238  Under the appropriate circumstances, the court may consider other factors, 
not mentioned here, that are unique to a particular case. If this occurs, the court 
should try to classify the additional factors into one of the three categories: position, 
conflicts, or motivations. 
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that disclosure is required, its discretion ends, and the Rule 
controls. A committee that is required to disclose should not be 
excused from disclosure regardless of any special circum-
stances. This is necessary for several reasons. First, Rule 2019 
is the only provision in the Bankruptcy Code that courts can 
use to regulate ad hoc committees.239 It is important that the 
Rule be followed in its entirety to promote fairness, equality, 
and integrity. Second, it will provide adequate notice to 
committees that all information listed under this part of the 
Rule is required, and they should be prepared to provide it if 
necessary.  
In presenting the information that should be required 
under the proposed rule, this Part evaluates the information 
that is currently required under Rule 2019 and concludes 
whether or not it should remain in the rule. The first three 
requirements listed below have been generally undisputed by 
parties involved in bankruptcy litigation. The last four 
requirements, however, have been the subject of much 
controversy and debate. As will be explained in greater detail 
below, this Note advocates that all information currently 
required under the Rule should remain the same, except for the 
price at which the claim was acquired. Under the proposed 
approach, the price acquired would be removed from the 
current Rule 2019 disclosure requirements. 
1. Names and Addresses of Creditors 
The names and addresses of the creditor or equity 
security holder should continue to be required under the rule. 
This information informs everyone who the parties of interest 
are and their contact information. In the past, this information 
has been voluntarily provided by committees participating in 
bankruptcy cases and thus should not be an issue in future 
litigation. 
2. Nature and Amount of Each Claim 
Under the current Rule, the nature and amount of the 
claim must be disclosed, as well as the time of acquisition, 
unless the claim was acquired more than one year prior to the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. Again, this part of the Rule 
  
 239 See supra Part I.B (discussing how Rule 2019 fits into the Bankruptcy 
Code’s overall disclosure scheme). 
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has not been controversial or challenged by committees 
involved in bankruptcy cases. Thus, it should remain in the 
rule since it serves a valid purpose of informing the debtor and 
other parties about the nature of the claims that are 
represented in the case. 
3. Information About the Committee 
The third requirement involves disclosure of the facts 
and circumstances related to the formation of the committee, 
including the names of all parties that arranged formation. 
This requirement has also been generally complied with in 
bankruptcy cases. It should remain a part of the Rule since it 
has been uncontested by committees in the past and provides 
all interested parties with the important basic information of 
who organized the committee and whom the committee 
represents. 
4. Amount of Claims Owned by Committee Members 
Disclosure of the amount of claims owned by committee 
members has been met with resistance from ad hoc 
committees. The current Rule requires each individual 
committee member to disclose the amount of claims they own. 
Members of ad hoc committees prefer to, and often voluntarily, 
disclose the aggregate amount of claims owned by the 
committee. However, despite the opposition, this requirement 
should remain a part of the Rule. While disclosure of the 
aggregate amount is helpful, disclosure on an individual basis 
is essential so that everyone knows who is involved and what 
his stake is in the bankruptcy case. 
5. The Dates Claims Were Acquired by Committee 
Members 
The date that the claims were acquired by the 
individual committee members is the second most contested 
piece of information that is currently required under the Rule. 
Hedge funds in particular have argued that this information is 
confidential and proprietary. They are very reluctant to make 
this information public because of a fear that it will result in 
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loss of leverage and that it will reveal their trading models or 
strategies.240  
This information should remain a part of the disclosure 
requirements for the following reasons. First, the dates that 
claims were acquired are not trade secrets or proprietary 
information that exposes business strategies or policies. 
Although hedge funds are secretive and seek to keep their 
trading information private, this information is not of such a 
nature that it will impact their business going forward. Hedge 
funds are primarily concerned about others being able to 
replicate their trading strategies.241 However, the dates on 
which they acquire their claims will not likely shed any light to 
outsiders about their strategy for investing. Second, this 
information is helpful in bankruptcy cases so that other parties 
can determine the motivations of the committee members and 
identify any potential conflicts of interest. Particularly when a 
committee member owns both debt and equity, the dates that 
these purchases were made could expose potential conflicts.242 
When the committee member’s interest in keeping the 
information private is balanced against the importance of the 
information in bankruptcy, the disclosure interest trumps the 
privacy interest. Therefore, the dates that the claims were 
acquired should remain a part of the Rule. 
6. The Price Paid for the Claims by Committee 
Members 
The price paid by committee members for the claims 
and interests they hold is undoubtedly the most controversial 
disclosure requirement under Rule 2019. Hedge funds have 
repeatedly objected to this requirement for the same reasons 
they do not want to disclose the dates they acquired the claims. 
In fact, the price and date combined is what they refer to as 
confidential trading information. For example, in Northwest, 
the committee specifically requested that this information be 
  
 240 See supra Part II.A.2. The ad hoc committee in Northwest argued that even 
if they were required to disclose this information, they should be allowed to file it 
under seal because it constituted trade secrets under § 107(b). 
 241  See supra Part I.A. 
 242 As noted in Part IV.C.2, supra, if debt and equity were purchased around 
the same dates, there may be an inherent conflict of interest that other stakeholders 
should be aware of. 
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filed under seal because they claimed it constituted trade 
secrets.243  
Though this Note rejects that argument, it advocates 
that the price paid should not be a disclosure requirement 
under a revised Rule 2019. This is the only piece of required 
information that should be removed from the current Rule. In 
arriving at this conclusion, this Note balances the hedge fund’s 
interest in keeping the information private against the need for 
disclosure in bankruptcy. Presumably, the main reason that 
hedge funds do not want to disclose the price paid for their 
holdings is a loss of leverage in future trades. Since the original 
purchase price would be public knowledge under the current 
Rule, any potential purchasers would recognize the profit that 
hedge funds stand to gain as a result of the transaction. Hedge 
funds are most secretive when it comes to this pricing infor-
mation, and requiring them to disclose it publicly in order to 
participate in bankruptcy proceedings will have a detrimental 
effect on liquidity in the distressed claims market.  
On the other hand, this Note also considers the 
importance of the purchase price in bankruptcy cases. The one 
benefit of disclosure is that the price may reveal ulterior 
motivations of hedge funds. For example, if they acquired their 
claims at a very low purchase price, they may be content with a 
lower recovery than others who purchased at face value. 
However, this information can also be easily discerned based 
on the purchase date. If the claim was acquired just before or 
during bankruptcy, it was likely purchased at a discount.  
More importantly, the purchase price of a claim is  
not relevant in determining recovery or participation in 
bankruptcy cases. Courts have consistently held that the price 
paid for a claim does not have any bearing on recovery.244 A 
  
 243 See supra Part II.A. 
 244 The Seventh Circuit has held: 
The debtor’s obligation is to pay his debts . . . . In the absence of some 
equitable reason, taking the case out of the ordinary rule, the prices which 
security holders pay for their securities in no wise affects the measure of 
their participation in reorganization or their voting power . . . . To reduce the 
participation to the amount paid for securities, in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances which are not present here, would reduce the value of such 
bonds to those who have them and want to sell them. This would result in 
unearned, undeserved profit for the debtor, destroy or impair the sales value of 
securities by abolishing the profit motive, which inspires purchasers. 
In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 57-58 (7th Cir. 1945) 
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has also held: 
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successful reorganization is not contingent on this information, 
and thus the market need to keep this information private 
outweighs the bankruptcy need to disclose it.  
This Note aims to strike a balance in revising the 
current Rule 2019. The goal is to ensure that the information 
required in bankruptcy proceedings is disclosed without 
discouraging future hedge fund investment in distressed 
securities. The purchase price of the claim presents a critical 
opportunity to apply this idea. The purchase price is not 
something that is absolutely necessary in bankruptcy. On the 
other hand, it is probably a “deal-breaker” when it comes to 
hedge fund participation, since hedge funds guard this 
information more closely than anything else. If forced to 
disclose the purchase price, it is highly probable that they will 
no longer invest in distressed claims, and the liquidity in the 
market would decrease significantly.245 Therefore, this Note 
proposes that the purchase price no longer be required under 
the Rule. Moreover, the purchase price is likely to be used 
aggressively by the debtor to discourage hedge fund partici-
pation in bankruptcy proceedings. Since it is well known by all 
parties that hedge funds are extremely reluctant to provide the 
purchase price, debtors may bring Rule 2019 motions requiring 
disclosure as a weapon to force hedge funds out of the bank-
ruptcy case altogether.  
7. Any Subsequent Sales of Claims 
Under the current Rule, any subsequent sale of claims 
by individual committee members must also be disclosed. This 
information is essential to bankruptcy cases and should remain 
in the Rule. One of the concerns in bankruptcy is whether other 
creditors may be harmed by actions of the committee. If 
  
Analysis shows the application of such a principle would be grossly 
inequitable to the holder of the secured debt. It would destroy or impair its 
sales value. Buyers purchase bonds or other secured indebtedness primarily 
from the profit motive . . . .He expects to realize out of the purchase more than 
the purchase price, at the same time running the risk of recovering less. 
Under the proposed equity, buyer, confined to the maximum of his purchase 
price, buys nothing but the chance to “break even” or make a loss. 
Security-First Nat’l Bank of L.A. v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 85 F.2d 557, 563 
(9th Cir. 1936) (emphasis added). 
 245  For a discussion of the arguments made by the LSTA and SIFMA that 
disclosure will negatively affect the claims trading markets, see supra note 126 and 
Part II.B.2, supra.  
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committee members were allowed to sell their claims without 
disclosing the sale, creditors depending on that committee to 
represent their interests would potentially be harmed. Because 
there is no countervailing reason to keep this information 
private, it should remain a part of the Rule. 
E. Questions 3: What Are the Sanctions for Noncompliance? 
The sanctions under this section should follow a strict 
rule-based approach as well. The sanctions are a key part of 
Rule 2019 because they serve as a deterrent to parties who are 
considering withholding information that they have been 
ordered to disclose. The Rule should be clear—if a party 
deliberately ignores a court’s order to disclose, it will not be 
permitted to participate in the bankruptcy proceedings. The 
judge must impose this sanction unless noncompliance was in 
error or accidental. While this may seem harsh, it puts all 
parties on notice of the consequences. If judges had more 
discretion, parties may opt not to disclose and then hope to 
convince the judge to impose a lesser sanction. However, this 
would defeat the Rule’s purpose and defeat the purpose of 
having sanctions that seek to deter noncompliance. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 2019 is an important disclosure rule that had 
essentially been overlooked until the Northwest and Scopac 
decisions in 2007. The divergence between those decisions 
raised the question of whether Rule 2019 should be applied to 
ad hoc committees comprised primarily of hedge funds and 
other private equity firms.  
Although Rule 2019 on its face applies to ad hoc 
committees, the legislative history indicates that its primary 
purpose was to address abuses by protective committees in 
1930s.246 Protective committees, however, are now a thing of the 
past. The committees that exist today, like ad hoc committees, 
are organized by creditors who seek to collectively participate 
in bankruptcy cases to share costs and increase their 
leverage.247 The Rule has not been changed in seventy years 
and does not contemplate the types of committees or investors 
that exist today. Furthermore, if required to comply with the 
  
 246 See supra Part I.B. 
 247 See supra Part I.A. 
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Rule, hedge funds and similar investors will likely stop trading 
in distressed claims and securities, which could decrease the 
liquidity in the market. 
While liquidity is an important consideration, this Note 
also recognizes the importance of transparency to bankruptcy 
proceedings, which the Rule seeks to preserve through its 
disclosure requirements.248 This creates a tension between 
liquidity and transparency—while disclosure implicates a 
liquidity problem, non-disclosure implicates a transparency 
problem.249 Therefore, this Note concludes that Rule 2019 
should be amended to address the current dynamics of Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceedings.250  
Finally, this Note presents a revised Rule 2019, which 
attempts to balance these competing interests.251 The goal in 
crafting this revision is twofold. First, it provides a framework 
for courts to use in determining whether or not a particular 
committee was required to disclose. Second, it changes the 
disclosure requirements to only require information that is 
essential to bankruptcy and removes unnecessary disclosures 
that discourage hedge fund investment in distressed securities. 
Although this Note mainly addressed the issue of 
whether Rule 2019 should apply to ad hoc committees 
comprised of hedge funds, the proposed rule can be applied to 
any ad hoc committee, regardless of whether it is made up of 
hedge funds. This Note thus exposes a larger problem with 
Rule 2019 and its inadequacy given the nature of bankruptcy 
cases today. This may be a lesson that other bankruptcy rules 
and procedures also need to be evaluated given the changing 
dynamics of Chapter 11 cases. 
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